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each negotiating actor looking at general economics indicators, development levels, 
structure of the agricultural sectors, and trade policies for agricultural products. 
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economic conditions and policies seem to be relatively less committed to the positions 
of the coalition they join. 
 
Keywords: Agricultural trade negotiations, Bargaining coalitions, WTO, Cluster analysis 
 
JEL Classification: F13, Q17 
 
 
A previous version of this paper was presented at IATRC – Summer Symposium (JRC, 
Seville, Spain, June 19
th-21
st) Pressures for Agricultural Policy Reform: WTO Panels 
and the Doha Round Negotiations. This work was supported by the Italian Ministry of 
University and Technological Research, under the Research Program of National 
Scientific Relevance on “The new multilateral trade negotiations within the World 
Trade Organisation (Doha Round): liberalisation prospects and the impact on the 
Italian economy”. 
The authors would like to thank Mariano D’Antonio, Pasquale De Muro and Silvia 









Address for correspondence: 
 
Fabrizio De Filippis 
Department of Economics 
University “Roma Tre” 
Via Ostiense, 139 
00154  Roma 
Italy 
Phone: +39 0657374077   
E-mail: defilipp@uniroma3.it   1
1.  Introduction 
The political economy approach has been extensively adopted in the analysis of the WTO 
negotiations. In particular, some contributions have focused the strategic interactions and the 
formation of bargaining coalitions, which have proved to be key actors in the current 
negotiation round (Kahler and Odell, 1989; Narlikar and Odell, 2004; Narlikar and Tussie, 
2004; Panagariya, 2002; Tussie and Glover, 1995). This paper aims at analysing the internal 
coherence of the existing coalitions in the Doha Round negotiations, with a special reference 
to agriculture. 
In principle, one may expect that individual countries join coalitions on the basis of similar 
expected benefits from a specific negotiation outcome. If this is true, the existing coalitions 
should present a certain degree of internal “homogeneity” of member countries, with respect 
to a set of variables related to their socio-economic structure. The setting up of a bargaining 
coalition such as the G-20, for example, was accompanied by sceptical comments pointing 
out that it combined a great diversity of members and quite different interests. 
Strategic behaviour may influence the decision whether to join certain coalitions, where 
coalition members negotiate over priorities and joint fallback positions in order to pool 
together technical expertise and political will. This leads to a “log-rolled agenda” that balance 
national positions cross the various issues. In this respect, it seems reasonable to expect that 
the greater the “similarity” among the participants in the coalition the more robust the 
coalition itself will be. 
This paper groups WTO members on the basis of a set of indicators concerning economic, 
social and institutional development level, openness to trade, agricultural productive structure 
and market access policies. The choice of the variables used in this analysis is based on a 
number of existing studies. Firstly, we refer to the literature on the linkages between 
economic growth, development, poverty and trade liberalization (Dollar and Kray, 2003, 
2004; Martin, 2001; Rodrik, 2000; Winters, 2004). For the variables more specifically related 
to agriculture, we consider studies focusing on the quantitative analysis of the relationship 
between the primary sector and the rest of the economy (e.g. Diaz-Bonilla et al., 2000; 
Gardner, 2003; Sarris, 2004). Finally, regarding the policy variables, we mainly refer to the 
market access, which is the most contentious issue under negotiation (Anania et al., 2004; 
Bureau and Salvatici, 2004). 
This set of indicators provides the basis for a cluster analysis of WTO members, following an 
approach already used in the literature on the present round of negotiations (Bjørnskov and 
Lind, 2002). We rely on structural data which are assumed to reflect the “true” interests of the 
negotiators, trying to capture the main characteristics that could explain internal cohesion. 
The counterfactual coalitions obtained from the cluster analysis are then compared with the 
existing ones. This shows how important structural features are in driving coalition formation, 
distinguishing within each coalition “core members” – those with more similar structures – 
from “strategic members” – those that join the coalition in order to get some kind of side 
payments. 
In order to achieve these objectives the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the Doha 
Round general framework is briefly outlined with specific reference to the agricultural 
negotiations and the bargaining coalitions emerged so far. In Section 3, we present the 
theoretical assumptions and the methodology adopted for the empirical analysis. Section 4 
discusses the results obtained, while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round: the formation of bargaining 
coalitions. 
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2.1  The general framework of the Doha Round agricultural negotiations 
In 2001, WTO members agreed in Doha to launch a new round of trade negotiations, 
encompassing the agricultural negotiations already started in 2000 according to the so-called 
“built-in” agenda. The 1994 Agreement on Agriculture, concluded as part of the Uruguay 
Round, laid down liberalisation commitments under three pillars that will also provide the 
basis of any new agreement: 
  market access, covering tariff ceilings (bindings) and liberalization commitments in 
terms of tariffs and tariff rate quotas; 
  domestic support, including subsidies and other programmes; 
  export competition, covering export subsidies, export credits, guarantees and insurance, 
food aid, exporting state trading enterprises, export restrictions and taxes. 
Each of the three pillars included provisions for the “special and differential treatment” of 
developing countries, such as exemptions from some commitments, lower reduction targets, 
and more time for their implementation. 
Negotiators missed the 31
st March 2003 deadline for producing “modalities” (i.e., numerical 
targets and formulas) for countries’ commitments, and the WTO Ministerial meeting, held in 
Cancún (Mexico) in September 2003, ended in deadlock. After Cancún, there were efforts to 
put the negotiations and the rest of the work programme back on track. The outcome was the 
“framework agreement” reached at the end of July 2004 (the so called “July package”) on 
moving forward the Doha Round of trade negotiations. 
As far as domestic support is concerned, the July package includes concrete targets for the 
reduction of overall domestic support and specifies that “blue box” levels will be capped, 
while no capping is imposed to the “green box”, as had been proposed by developing 
countries. The reduction will be made under a tiered formula that cuts subsidies progressively 
– higher levels of trade-distorting domestic support are subject to greater reductions. 
Moreover a downpayment is imposed, that is a commitment to reduce the “amber box” of at 
least 20% in the first year of the implementation period. 
On export competition, the Doha mandate calls for “reductions of, with a view to phasing out, 
all forms of export subsidies”. In the July package, WTO members have agreed to establish 
detailed modalities to implement the elimination of all forms of export subsidies and the 
discipline of all export measures with equivalent effect by a credible end date. 
Out of the three main issues under negotiation, market access stands out as the most 
contentious one. The Doha mandate commits WTO members to “substantially improve 
market access”. According to the July package, agricultural tariffs will be cut on the basis of a 
single, tiered approach: the higher the tariff, the higher the tariff cut. However, the agreement 
caters for several concerns: either from developed countries, to address some “sensitive 
products”, or developing countries, to benefit from a special and differential treatment across 
the board, e.g. lower tariff cuts and special treatment on market opening for the so-called 
“special products”. Meetings held since August 2004 confirmed the existence of different 
views about the formula to be used for tariff reduction. Some countries argue strongly for a 
non-linear, Swiss formula to be applied in each of the band of the tiered approach. This is 
vigorously objected by other countries, proposing instead average linear reductions (Uruguay 
Round-style) in each band.  
Furthermore, the tiered approach requires the calculation of ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) 
of specific tariffs, in order to compare them. Far from being a purely technical exercise, this 
became a very sensitive and highly politicized issue. Only at the “mini-ministerial” meeting 
held in Paris in May 2005, the so called “Five Interested Parties” (Australia, Brazil, EU, India 
and US) found an agreement on the methodology to be followed in the computation of the 
AVEs. 
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2.2  A brief overview of the coalitions in the Doha Round 
Several countries’ groups are playing a role in the present round of negotiations. They can be 
broadly classified according to the following typology:  
1) “Structural groups”, whose aggregation is based on specific commercial relationships such 
as free trade areas (e.g., ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, etc.), or on other economic interests 
or geographic similarities (e.g., Least Developed Countries or Net Food Importing 
Developing Countries). These groups do not necessarily sponsor specific proposals, but they 
are often referred to in the negotiations. 
2) “Representative groups”, which are set up with the specific objective of representing a 
large variety of national interests in order to overcome the deadlocks in the negotiations. The 
members of these groups are selected among the key political and economic players in trade 
negotiations, assuming that joint proposal coming from them may be acceptable for all other 
WTO members. Examples of (more or less) representative groups are the partnership of the 
US and the EU in issuing joint proposals (as happened before the Cancún meeting), the so-
called Quad (Quadrilaterals) with Canada, the EU, Japan and the US, or the more recent and 
already mentioned Five Interested Parties (FIP). Other “informal” representative groups are 
formed by the countries attending the so-called “mini-ministerial” meetings, where specific 
negotiation issues are discussed with the aim of finding a common point of view to be 
presented at the plenary sessions. 
3) “Bargaining coalitions”, where a group of countries forms a preliminary consesus on a a 
common proposal, aiming at increasing their collective bargaining power. The Cairns Group, 
the G-10, the G-20, the G-33 are all examples of “bargaining coalitions”, which submit 
proposals both on specific issues and on the whole negotiation agenda. 
In our analytical framework, we consider only this third cathegory, focusing our attention 
upon the mechanism of formation of bargaining coalitions between agents with (probably) 
heterogeneous preferences but with a common interest in increasing their bargaining power. 
After the Ministerial meeting in Cancún, most observers agreed that developing countries had 
played an innovative role in comparison with the Uruguay Round, showing a greater capacity 
to coordinate their positions. In particular, a remarkable development has been the rise of a 
new powerful negotiating voice among developing countries with the formation of the G-20, a 
group centred around Brazil, India, China and South Africa. This was set up just before the 
Cancún Ministerial, in order to co-ordinate pressure on the EU and the US to reduce their 
import tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support. 
More generally, in the current agriculture negotiations we can distinguish between two main 
categories of developing countries: those more ‘offensive’, looking for gains in their market 
share and therefore asking for substantial trade liberalization; and those more ‘defensive’, 
aiming at keeping some protection for their agricultural markets. 
Countries with an “offensive” attitude are, among others, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, 
Thailand and, more recently, Pakistan. Countries with a defensive attitude form the majority 
of the developing world, including India, China, Indonesia (leader of the G-33), Philippines, 
or the Caribbean and Central American countries. Most of the G-90 countries (a grand 
coalition formed by the African Union, Least Developed Countries and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific block) have defensive interests as well and, except at ministerial 
meetings (Doha and again in Cancún ), they have functioned as separate groupings in the 
WTO. Another bargaining coalition with a mostly defensive attitude is the G-33, consisting 
mainly of net food-importing developing countries concerned about the prospects of 
premature liberalisation at home.
1 
                                                 
1 The exact memberships of bargaining coalitions such as G-90, G-20, and G-33 are currently not clear, and they 
have changed many times during last years (Hilary, 2004). For our analytical purpose, we have adopted as the   4
In other cases, existing coalitions are mixed groups, bringing together countries from both the 
defensive and the offensive side. In the case of the G-20, Brazil and India play a key role in 
uniting the two traditionally opposing camps. 
Another coalition bringing together seemingly heterogeneous countries is the Cairns Group. It 
was set up just before the Uruguay Round began in 1986 to exert pressure towards 
agricultural trade liberalization. Its members are diverse, including both developed and 
developing countries, but share a common objective - agricultural trade liberalization - and 
the common view that they lack the resources to compete with larger countries in domestic 
and export subsidies. 
Finally, the G-10 calls for a conservative approach, with some strong request on maintaining 
as much as possible the existing policies. These countries, as a matter of fact, maintain high 
tariffs in order to protect domestic markets. 
 
3.  Methodological issues and the choice of the variables 
 
3.1  A “structural” analysis of WTO bargaining coalitions 
The World Trade Organisation can be considered the outcome of a collective action designed 
to address the undersupply of “free trade” as a public good. Free trade is non-rival by nature 
and non-excludable by choice, as WTO trade liberalisation actions are based on the most 
favoured nation principle. In this sense, “liberalised trade is an impure public good as well, 
since it can be subject to some excludability, either through restricting membership to the 
WTO or through use of ‘unfair trade laws’ to exclude exports from targeted countries” 
(Shaffer, 2004, p.463). 
Even if exclusion from the WTO is possible in principle, in fact it is not desirable due to the 
increased “global” benefits accruing from more participants. From this standpoint, free trade 
is definitely a “quasi-public good” or “near-public good” for which exclusion is possible but 
not desirable (Stiglitz, 1986). In terms of efficiency, the more countries “produce” and 
“consume” free trade, the better society becomes as a whole. 
In addition, free trade is not a homogenous good; rather, it can be considered a 
“multidimensional” good, as a consequence of the possibility for the agents to choose among 
different “baskets” of policies all delivering the same global “amount” of free trade. In this 
sense the agents show differentiated preferences over the set of feasible policies.
2 As the 
nature of the good under analysis is so complex, its supply calls for a “two-stage collective 
action”, partially similar to the two-stage game interaction developed in the context of the 
non-cooperative bargaining theory.
3 In the first stage countries decide non-cooperatively 
whether or not to sign the agreement (to join the WTO in our context). In the second stage, 
which is the focus of our analysis, countries set their policy (their preference for the final 
negotiating outcome in our framework), in order to maximize their welfare function. At this 
point, the policy space is not limited to two options (join or not the WTO) as in the first stage, 
and there is a continuum of feasible policies within the free trade vs. autarchy dichotomy: 
once a country decides to join the WTO (first-stage), it has a set of preference for a specific 
outcome of the negotiation. According to these preferences, each country will define a 
negotiating position in order to maximise its utility (second-stage). 
The preferences are influenced by the heterogeneity of the agents which implies different 
payoff functions. Since a country’s influence over the final negotiation outcome crucially 
                                                                                                                                                          
final data source, the official document provided by the WTO, updated at 1
st December 2004 (WTO, 2004), as in 
Appendix B, Table B1. 
2 For the relevance of public good differentiation in the formation of groups, see Haimanko et al. (2004). 
3 Botteon and Carraro (1997) clearly discuss this point with reference to environmental coalitions.   5
depends on its bargaining power, “coalitions” between agents with overlapping preferences 
are formed, for purpose of increasing their bargaining power, i.e. their chances of making the 
final negotiation outcome closer to their optimal policy choice. 
Following this line of reasoning, bargaining coalitions should be based upon a common milieu 
of interests of their participants. The closer an individual country’s preference is to this 
milieu, the stronger its commitment to the coalition. In the same vein, the closer a country’s 
economic structure and policy stance are to the “average” of the coalition, the more likely is 
that its preferences coincide with the common interest. This would make unlikely the 
possibility of a defection in favour of another group or policy outcome, unless there are 
payoffs related to the countries’ specific interests within the negotiation. In this latter case, the 
commitment of the individual country to the group’s common position may turn out to be 
very weak, and mainly related to the evolution of the power relationship outside the 
negotiation context. 
To sum-up, we may suppose that each negotiating actor faces a trade-off between its 
bargaining power and the “distance” between its “optimal” policy outcome and the policy in 
fact supported in the negotiation. If a country chooses to negotiate as a singleton, it is able to 
support, as final outcome of the negotiation, precisely its “optimal” policy. In this scenario, if 
its proposal is adopted as final decision, its pay-off will be maximised. At the same time, 
however, the country’s bargaining power can be supposed to be at its minimum and the cost 
of negotiating (e.g. the cost of being represented in Geneva, etc.) at its maximum.
4 
On the contrary, when a country decides to join a coalition it inevitably accepts to support the 
group’s policy outcome which, as we discussed above, can be more or less distant from its 
optimal policy, thus reducing the countries’ payoff in case of acceptance of the group’s 
proposal. However, this “dilution” of the country’s preference is compensated by both an 
increased bargaining power (or by an increase in the probability of gaining at least the 
reduced pay-off), and a reduction of the negotiating costs (that will be shared among the 
various members). 
In this context, ceteris paribus, “big” countries (such as the EU or the US) have less 
incentives to join coalitions as their bargaining power is relevant and their negotiating cost are 
relatively insignificant, while “small” countries benefit more from joining coalitions as their 
cost opportunity of negotiating as singletons is much higher. 
Within this theoretical framework, the understanding of the structure and the internal 
coherence of existing bargaining coalitions implies making some assumptions over the “true” 
preference structure of each country, grouping them according to these preferences and then 
assessing their distance from the coalition’s interest “milieu”. Such an exercise would provide 
some insights on both the “coherence” of the various coalitions and the “long-term 
commitment” of each member. 
Having acknowledged that a certain degree of arbitrariness is intrinsically related to every 
attempt to represent a country’s preferences over such a complex issue as trade regime, we 
suppose that countries’ official positions may also be affected by their tactic behaviour. 
Consequently, assuming that countries do not reveal their real preferences at all, we treat this 
information as “unknown”.
5 By grounding our reasoning in the “economic theory of 
alliances” literature (see Sandler and Hartley 2001 among the others), we suppose that 
                                                 
4 The final decision is only formally based on a head-count mechanism. In fact the bargaining power of 
individual countries can be, more realistically, considered as proportional to its capability to influence other 
countries’ position. 
5 On the contrary, Bjørnskov and Lind (2002) examined countries’ “revealed preferences” as stated in their 
official WTO positions, and attempted a “quantification” of such preferences by rating their official positions on 
a number of issues   6
national “true” (unobservable) preferences for the final negotiation outcome are shaped by a 
set of (observable) structural features. 
In this framework, we have defined a set of structural indicators (that will be discussed in 
further details below) which we suppose to be related, through a variety of mechanisms, to the 
formation of each country’s preferences. Without making any assumption on the form of this 
relationship, we use the full set of indicators as a proxy of the countries “true” preferences. 
Consequently, we assess the similarity of these indicators by mean of a purely descriptive 
statistical methodology such as cluster analysis, which enables us to form groups of countries 
with (supposedly) similar preferences, i.e. representing the “natural” Doha Round coalitions. 
In addition, the cluster analysis will allow us to represent each country’s “distance” from its 
coalition “centroid” thus giving us a clue of its commitment to the coalition itself. 
 
3.2  The choice and construction of the proxies for countries’ preferences: “five 
dimensional” indicators 
In our view, the formation of preferences on the outcome of the negotiation (or on the 
preferred level of provision of the quasi public good “free trade”) is related to a large set of 
features, which is not limited to the strictly economic sphere, as it would be according to the 
simplistic dichotomy developed vs. developing countries. In order to have quite a general 
framework, we gathered an extensive set of structural and policy indicators. 
We have divided the 39 indicators, listed in Table 1, into five different groups: 1) Economic 
dimension, Development, Agriculture, Trade and Trade policy.
6 The choice of the variables 
was grounded in the literature on international economics, development and trade. All 
variables were calculated as an average value of the last five available years in order to 
eliminate possible distortions due to punctual data errors (Appendix A, Table A1). Trade 
policy variables refer to a single year, due to lack of data for all countries considered.
7 
Within the economic dimension we include few general macroeconomic indicators 
representing a synthetic but comprehensive data set which is currently used in most of the 
studies oriented to analyze the linkages among trade openness and economic growth (Frankel 
and Romer, 1999; Winters, 2004). As far as the latter is concerned, we consider three 
different variables: the GDP per capita level expressed at constant 1995 US$ at purchasing 
power parity; the GDP per capita growth rate, in order to neutralize effects linked to high 
population growth; the simple GDP growth rate, to have an evaluation of the general 
economic performance. In addition, the inflation rate was taken as an indicator of 
macroeconomic stability (Ranis, 2004), since there seems to be enough evidence showing that 
inflation is lower in open economies (Winters, 2004). As far as openness of the economic 
system is concerned, we use a widely used measure such as the level of Foreign Direct 
Investments (Martin, 2001; Ranis, 2004). 
Another important issue is the level and quality of institutions, because it is widely accepted 
that a trade opening policy framework require institutional capacity, which is a scarce 
resource in developing countries (Rodrik, 2000). The share of government expenditure in the 
GDP is adopted as a proxy of ‘institutions engagement’. 
                                                 
6 In order to make it easier to distinguish the variables from each dimension, variables’ names start with letters 
‘G’, ‘D’, ‘AG’, ‘T’, and ‘PO’, in order to indicate the General Economic system, the Development level, the 
Agriculture sector, the Trade issue, and the trade Policy issues, respectively. Furthermore, within the trade 
dimension we have specified where the trade index is related to agriculture (TAG). 
7 For the structural indicators data set, sources are: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) various 
years; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), data for Human Development Reports, various years; 
International Labour Organization (ILO), Labour Force Statistics; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
FAOSTAT. For the trade policy indicators, values are from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) system.   7
We classified the Development indicators into four possible categories, on the basis of the 
theoretical literature on human development and its linkages with economic growth (Boozer 
et al., 2004). The human well-being is represented by: i) an index of education built as the 
average primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (as defined by UNESCO);
8 ii) a 
measure of public health expenditures as percentage of GDP; iii) a representation of 
household consumption expenditures as a proxy of the absolute poverty level, ignoring 
inequalities within households (Ravallion, 2003).
9 
Other development variables included in our analysis refer to labour force, innovation and 
technology, and food security, a crucial issue for several developing countries. Regarding the 
labour force conditions, we use the unemployment rate, while for the distribution of 
technology we have included the number of internet users and its annual percentage change 
over the period 1998-2002. 
                                                 
8 UNESCO defines the gross enrolment ratio as the enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in 
give school-year (Education and Literacy Indicators, 2003). 
9 The debate on specific effects of globalization and trade openness on poverty and inequality is rather complex 
and it is out of the scope of this work. For further details on this issue, see Dollar and Kraay (2002, 2004), 
Ravallion (2003, 2004).   8
Table 1 –Set of indicators: summary statistics 
 Categories    Indicators  Code Range*  Mean*  Coef.Var*
General    GDP per capita (level, 1995 US$ PPP)  GDPCPL  31491.89 7715.90 8383.06
   
GDP per capita growth (annual % change 10 
years) 
GDPCPG  12.28 1.59 2.58
  X  GDP growth (annual % change 10 years)  GDPTOG  13.53 3.06 1.22
  X  Inflation rate  GINFLRT  73.06 8.06 21.38
Openness  X 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% 
GDP) 




















Institutions   
General government final consumption 
expenditure (% GDP) 
GOVEXP  35.42 15.71 2.39
  Education index (average enrollment ratio)  DEDUIND  0.87 0.62 0.07 Human  well-
being  X  Health expenditure, public (% GDP)  DHEAEXP  7.52 3.50 0.86
    Household consumption (% GDP)  DHOUCON  69.01 68.27 2.51
Labour force    Unemployment (% total labor force)  DUNEMP  42.90 10.12 4.41
  Internet users (per 1,000 people)  DINTERLV  572.12 125.71 200.15 Innovation and 
Technology  X  Internet users (% change)  DINTERG  24.63 2.95 5.74
Food security    Calories per capita  DCALCAP  1928.00 2658.03 95.36













   X  Total exports/Food imports  DFOOIMP  63.60 14.24 7.96
General  X  Agriculture, Value Added (% GDP)  AGVA  59.63 16.43 12.31
  X 
Employment in agriculture as % of total 
employment (% change) 
AGEMP  65.22 -19.12 -8.31
    Rural population (% of total population)  AGRUR  88.11 47.00 10.04
  X  Land use, arable land (% of land area)  AGLAND  62.07 16.84 12.16
Productivity    Cereal yield (kg per ha)  AGCER  7632.84 2722.18 1224.48
  X  Agricultural Value Added per Worker  AGVAWR  51809.64 6992.18 18787.69
    Agri V.A/ (arable land, ha)  AGVALA  18101.58 2082.77 4281.44
  X  Workers in agriculture per ha  AGWRHA  8.83 1.13 1.87
X 
Agricultural machinery, tractors per 100 ha 
of arable land 















  Fertilizer consumption (100 grams per ha)  AGFERT  6279.52 1224.40 1931.10
Agriculture  X  (Agri imp + Agri exp)/ Agri V.A.  TAGIEVA  11.01 1.39 2.29
  X  Agri imp/Total imp  TAGIMTI  0.42 0.11 0.04
  X  Agri exp/Total exp  TAGEXTE  0.88 0.14 0.17
  X  (Imp-Exp)/(Imp+Exp)  TAGSTB  1.83 0.12 1.72
General  X  Exports, tot (% of GDP)  TEXPGDP  111.10 38.51 11.24
  X  Imports, tot (% of GDP)  TIMPGDP  98.43 44.30 9.75
  X  Manif imp/Total imp  TMANIMP  77.02 67.66 1.97







   X 
Computer, communications and other 
services (% Total exp) 
TCOMEXP  39.06 6.37 4.35
X  Average bound tariff  POAVBD  199.93 49.97 35.97 Import Own 
tariffs  X  Variance of bound tariff  POVRBD  4967.07 357.65 1265.21
  X  Water in tariffs  POWAT  190.53 35.25 44.57















tariffs  X  Preference Margin  POPMS  22.12 8.50 6.42
Notes: X = chosen variables for cluster analysis;   * = non standardized variables   9
As far as food security is concerned, we refer to a specific work made by Diaz-Bonilla et al. 
(2000), considering three of the five variables included in the cluster analysis of these authors: 
i) calories per capita per day as specific indicator for nutrition and food consumption levels, 
ii) food production per capita as a representative measure of self sufficiency or the ability of 
countries to feed themselves, and iii) the ratio of total exports on food imports as a measure of 
the capacity of a single country to finance the food imports with the export flows in other 
goods and services. 
As underlined by Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2000), a country that is a net food importer and for 
which the total food bill takes a large percentage of total exports is likely to be more 
vulnerable than a country with a low share of food imports on total exports. 
Since this paper focuses on the agricultural negotiations, the structure of Agriculture has a 
special importance in shaping the countries’ position on agricultural trade issues. The 
selection of the most suitable indicators has been driven by a careful consideration of the 
existing literature aimed at offering a comparative analysis of the various agricultural systems 
(e.g. Sarris 2004 for the G-20 case). The related set of indicators combines information on the 
relative importance of agriculture for the national economy, the relative abundance and 
productivity of the factors of production, and the level of innovation embodied in the primary 
sector. 
Turning to Trade indicators, the general structure of trade flows is represented by exports and 
imports value as percentage of GDP level. In order to represent the sector specialization of 
trade, we chose the percentage of manufactured imports and exports on total imports and total 
exports, respectively. Furthermore, the degree of international competitiveness of the service 
sector and the degree of technical innovation should be captured by a specific indicator 
concerning the percentage of computer, communications and other services exports on total 
exports. For agricultural trade, the variables included in the analysis attempt at capturing its 
relative importance with respect to both general trade flows, and agricultural output 
(agricultural imports plus agricultural exports related to agricultural value added). Additional 
information regarding the net importer or exporter position of the country in terms of 
agricultural goods was introduced by a standardized balance of trade index.
10 
As far as Trade Policy indicators are concerned, we have mainly focused our attention upon 
market access by considering both the tariffs imposed by a country on its imports and the 
tariffs the same country faces on the world market when exporting its goods. 
We characterize tariff protection on agricultural products using three different indices based 
on average bound tariff calculated on the nomenclature HS 2002 at chapter level (2 digit). 
Since a larger dispersion in the tariff structure implies larger costs in terms of efficiency and 
welfare, we include in the analysis both the mean and the variance of the tariff structure 
(Bureau and Salvatici, 2004). Moreover, the “tariffication” required by the Uruguay Round 
Agreement allowed each country to provide its own estimates of the tariff equivalents. This 
resulted in many cases in a “binding overhang”, with tariffs bound above the actual applied 
rates (also known as the “water in tariffs” issue).
11 
Regarding the export side (i.e., the tariffs that each country faces on the foreign markets) we 
implemented two indices. The first one is the simple average of the highest applied MFN 
tariff for each chapter that the analysed country faces in importing markets (we have included 
                                                 
10 (Imp – Exp)/(Imp + Exp). Positive (negative) values of the index means that the country is a net importer 
(exporter) of agricultural products 
11 More specifically, the average bound tariff for each country was calculated as the weighted average of bound 
tariffs for each chapter (01-23) and the corresponding import flow from the rest of the World. The Variance of 
bound tariffs was obtained as the variance of the 23 tariff values (based on the simple average of the tariffs for 
each product line at 6 digit level). The indicator for the so-called water in tariffs was built as the average of the 
difference between the notified bound tariff for each chapter and the relative effectively applied MFN (Most 
Favourite Nation), weighted with import flows.   10
all importing countries available on the UNCTAD-TRAINS database). The second one is the 
average of the preference margins that each country benefits in the international market. More 
specifically, we have singled out the highest difference between applied MFN and effectively 
applied preferential rate for each chapter and we have then computed the simple average of 
these 23 preference margins. However, such an index is not easy to interpret since data do not 
allow distinguishing between bilateral and unilateral preferential treatments. For this reason, 
and considering that the index is highly correlated with average highest MFN (see below, 
Appendix A, Table A7), this index was not included in the cluster analysis. 
We do not provide any specific indicators concerning the other two pillars of trade 
liberalisation, domestic support and export subsidies. In the case of the former, comparable 
data for the various “boxes” are difficult to obtain for a large sample of countries. As far as 
the latter are concerned, in practice only the EU actually grants direct export subsidies, while 
on indirect subsidies there is no sufficient available information. 
 
3.3  Cluster analysis of bargaining coalitions 
The methodology implemented for the analysis of the “convergence” of negotiating actors’ 
interests is based on cluster analysis techniques. Although we have chosen a different 
mechanism to model countries’ preferences, we follow a procedure similar to Bjørnskov and 
Lind (2002) in order to reproduce the formation of bargaining coalitions. Another interesting 
application of cluster analysis techniques to WTO negotiations was proposed by Diaz-Bonilla 
et al. (2000) in the context of food security issues. 
Cluster analysis is a “generic term for procedures which seek to uncover groups in data” 
(Everitt et al., 2001, p. 5), used to create partitions of the data according to a pre-determined 
algorithm. The most coherent techniques with the theoretical framework outlined above are 
the so called optimization cluster techniques, which partition data by either minimizing or 
maximising some numerical criteria. In particular we will apply a k-mean procedure which 
produces a partition of the data which minimizes the within-group sum of squared errors in 
terms of the Euclidean distance from the group centroid (i.e. the vector of the means of all 
variables calculated on the observations included in the cluster). The recursive algorithm used 
to pursue such a minimisation requires the a priori definition of the desired number of 
clusters and the specification of the relative cluster centroid in order to initialize the 
procedure. Therefore, in order to produce consistent results this choice has to be driven by an 
a priori knowledge of the phenomenon under scrutiny (Milligan, 1980; Everitt et al., 2001). 
The number of coalitions focused in our analysis is set as the number of clusters to be 
searched in the data, and the “leading” countries of existing coalitions are indicated as initial 
centroid for the recursive procedure. Once this information is provided, each country is 
assigned to the group whose centroid is closer in terms of Euclidean distance. Then the 
centroid of each group is calculated again, and each country is assigned to the group whose 
centroid is closer. Every time a cluster changes, by losing or gaining an observation, the 
cluster’s centroid is recalculated. The process is reiterated until no further changes are 
possible, thus minimizing the objective function (Everitt et al., 2001; Minitab, 1999). 
When compared to hierarchical techniques (where observations are progressively joint into 
clusters without the possibility of changing their initial allocation) the k-means procedure 
seems particularly appropriate to the purposes of our analysis. In our case, as a matter of fact, 
a priori knowledge of the groups’ structure overcomes the main limitation of this 
methodology – i.e. the arbitrary choice of the number of clusters to be identified in the data.   11
Our sample well represents the population of the WTO members as almost all countries are 
included in the analysis.
12 The issue of collinearity between variables, which Sassi (2003) 
underline as a source of bias towards the information provided by the correlated variables, has 
been addressed by checking the correlation matrix for all the variables and preliminarily 
excluding the most correlated ones from the analysis. In addition, as cluster analysis results 
are very sensitive to the presence of outliers, we have carefully checked for them. In the case 
of countries showing outlying values for many variables, we excluded the specific country 
from the analysis. When just one individual variable assumed an extreme value for a specific 
country, we have equated the outlying value to the immediately inferior/superior value for the 
same variable.
13 
The effect of different units of measurement of the variables has been addressed by basing the 
analysis upon z-scores (the variables minus its mean and divided by its standard deviation), 
thus preventing a bias towards the variables with larger absolute values. 
Overall, the k-mean cluster analysis, once specific attention is devoted to the technicalities 
outlined above, provides us with a “readable map” of the multidimensional (R
n) space in 
which countries’ preferences are formed. The k-mean procedure, being based on the 
minimization/maximization of a specific objective function, provides a credible representation 
of the formation of bargaining coalitions. Furthermore, the output of the quantitative analysis 
provides valuable information on the structural features of these “natural” coalitions and on 
their reciprocal distances, which in turn may provide useful clues on potential convergence of 
interests between existing coalitions. 
 
4. Empirical  results 
 
4.1  Existing bargaining coalitions: descriptive analysis 
A descriptive analysis of the existing bargaining coalitions can be based on Table 2, which 
includes the main indicators for seven groups: on the basis of the whole indicators data set is a 
very first step in order to consider differences and similarities among and within the groups. 
We have therefore reported the main statistics for seven bargaining coalitions: G-90, G-20, 
Cairns Group, G-10, G-33, the EU and the US (Table 2).
14 
Looking at the economic system, it is hardly surprising that the bargaining coalitions with 
developing and least developed countries as principal members (G-90, G-20, and G-33), 
present low levels of income per capita (GDPCPL), high level of inflation (GINFLRT) 
(mainly for the African Group and Latin American economies), and good performance in 
terms of Foreign Direct Investments (GFDIGDP) (especially for G-33). G-90 seems to be the 
group with the worst performance in terms of economic growth (growth of income per capita, 
GDPCPG), and with the highest coefficient of variation for the inflation rate, meaning that 
                                                 
12 The WTO members considered for our analysis are those listed by WTO at the end of 2004 (WTO, 2004). The 
members not included for lack of data are Bahrain, Brunei, Cuba, Hong Kong, Israel, Liechtenstein, Macao, 
Maldives, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Chinese Taipei, and 
United Arab Emirates. The final data set covers 129 countries including European Union members. 
Iceland was not included in the final cluster analysis due to outlier values for many variables. 
13 In general, if there was an outlier many times above (or below) the average value for any specific indicator (4-
5 times above/below the mean) the outlier value has been replaced with the second highest (lowest) value. 
14 According to the typology presented in Section 2, the EU is a “structural” rather than “bargaining” coalition. 
Nonetheless, since we had the data for each Member country, we thought that it may be interesting to compare 
the EU with the other groups. For the same reason, we included in Table 2 also the US, even though only 
reporting the mean values. Further details for statistics on the whole data set are available in Appendix A, Table 
A2, A3, A4.   12
there is a great heterogeneity within the members. On the opposite, the US presents an income 
per capita ten times higher than G-90, and the lowest inflation rate. 
The values of economic variables are heterogeneous also in the case of the Cairns Group, as it 
is indicated by the high value of the coefficient of variation of income per capita (GDPCPL). 
Members of this Group, as a matter of fact, are at rather different stages of development. 
 
Table 2 – Summary statistics for existing coalitions 
Indicators  Statistics  G-90 G-20  CAIRNS  G-10 G-33  EU-25 US 
GDPCPL  Mean  3015  4771 8774 18334 4061 17866 31018
  Coef.  Var. 2731 1455 5399 5905 2876 2318  -
GDPCPG Mean  1.08  1.45 1.89 1.99 1.55 2.94 1.85
  Coef.  Var. 3.47 3.03 2.27 0.93 3.15 0.78  -
GINFLRT  Mean 9.30  11.84 5.96 3.54 9.55 3.39 2.31
 Coef.  Var.  27.46  23.10 4.04 3.37 21.91  1.66  -
GFDIGDP Mean  4.35  3.01 3.33 2.60 4.42 6.49 2.08
  Coef.  Var. 5.48 1.49 1.50 1.63 4.00 3.87  -
DEDUIND Mean  0.47  0.62 0.71 0.79 0.55 0.85 0.91
  Coef.  Var. 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01  -
DHEAEXP Mean  2.54  2.62 3.48 4.46 2.60 5.63 5.88
  Coef.  Var. 0.44 0.59 0.84 0.93 0.47 0.19  -
DINTERG  Mean 4.69 3.00 1.65 0.74 3.14 0.75 0.20
  Coef.  Var. 6.16 2.46 1.62 0.44 3.43 0.25  -
DFOOCAP Mean  121.88  193.93 349.69 202.32 136.57 391.82 504.50
 Coef.  Var.  32.04  65.30 198.01 33.37 31.04  114.85  -
DFOOIMP Mean  8.37  17.36 23.01 25.23 11.60 19.80 38.10
  Coef.  Var. 3.00 8.49 8.75 6.90 5.06 2.93  -
AGVA  Mean  24.52  14.33 11.07 5.32 17.60 3.78 1.61
  Coef.  Var. 9.69 4.58 3.46 5.43 7.48 0.85  -
AGLAND  Mean 14.25 13.91 9.37 21.99 15.20 27.12 19.13
 Coef.  Var.  13.16  12.30 4.96 15.35 10.62  6.95  -
AGEMP Mean  -11.20  -17.28 -17.72 -36.15 -15.80 -31.57 -25.93
  Coef.  Var. -6.42 -3.36 -3.64 -3.32 -6.79 -3.09  -
AGVAWR  Mean  1554  1953 7421 15593 2145 19938 51824
 Coef.  Var.  5481  1423 17755 7131 5554  10100  -
AGMACH Mean  0.75  1.07 1.42 16.79 1.28 11.00  2.74
  Coef.  Var. 1.60 0.74 1.19 17.87 3.31 8.54  -
TAGEXTE Mean  0.17  0.16 0.19 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.05
  Coef.  Var. 0.21 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.05  -
TAGSTB  Mean  0.23 -0.12 -0.36 0.40 0.15  0.08 -0.11
 Coef.  Var.  0.91  -1.71 -0.22 0.42 1.12  1.28  -
TMANEXP Mean  30.86  44.97 48.61 72.62 40.70 77.62 82.27
 Coef.  Var.  23.57  16.93 11.29 10.23 22.75  1.88  -
POAVBD  Mean 73.12 60.35 35.75 41.62 72.76 15.11  4.90
 Coef.  Var.  23.13  34.52 19.00 15.22 26.08  0.00  -
POVRBD  Mean 307.30 274.12 161.09 1599 354.58 330.33  61.57
  Coef.  Var.  889.07  453.51 291.52 2325 2032 - -
POWAT  Mean  57.64  45.63 26.84 12.40 56.11 0.00 0.74
  Coef.  Var.  27.28  31.33 21.83 41.34 27.04 - -
 
The development indicators present several interesting results in terms of well-being, 
technological innovation and food security. The first two variables, the index of education 
(DEDUIND) and the level of public health expenditures as percentage of GDP (DHEAEXP), 
denote fewer investments in human capital for G-90 and G-33, while G-20 seems to have an 
education level quite higher than other developing countries groups. Another interesting 
indication is provided by the degree of technological innovation, where the internet users   13
growth rate (DINTERG) is much higher for least developed countries (G-90) and lower for G-
10, the EU and the US. 
Looking at food security, the first indicator, calories per capita, draws a clear separation 
between developed and developing countries. This is hardly surprising, while the other two 
indices (food production per capita, DFOOCAP and the ratio of total exports on food imports, 
DFOOIMP) are more differentiated. The Cairns Group, the EU and the US have much larger 
food production per capita than the G-10. Considering the ratio between total exports and 
food imports, G-20 and Cairns Group present the highest values due to the presence of net 
food exporting countries, while G-90 and EU register the lowest values. 
The structure of the agricultural sector is quite differentiated between groups. G-10, the EU 
and the US countries have low values of agricultural value added as a percentage of GDP 
(AGVA), and of agricultural employment as a percentage of total labour force (AGEMP), but 
high value added per worker (AGVAWR) and strong capital intensity (AGMACH). On the 
contrary, the G-90 has the more labour intensive agriculture, with low machinery and 
fertilizers levels, and a low value added per worker. G-20 and Cairns Group present similar 
values for most of the indicators considered, with the exception of agricultural arable land 
(AGLAND) and value added per worker (AGVAWR). As far as the former is concerned, 
values are much more homogeneous within the Cairns Group. This group also presents a 
relatively high agricultural value added per worker, due to the presence of developed 
countries, such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 
Trade statistics and trade policy variables confirm the difference between G-20 and Cairns 
Group on one side, and G-10, the EU and the US on the other side. In particular, G-20 and 
Cairns Group are more export-oriented than G-10, the EU and the US in terms of the 
agricultural exports’ share in total exports (TAGEXT) and according to the standardized 
agricultural trade balance (TAGSTB). Looking at general trade, there is a certain degree of 
accordance between the two agricultural exporters groups, confirming that Cairns and G-20 
are generally export-oriented. On the contrary, G-90 and G-33 have the highest percentage of 
agricultural imports on total imports and this value corresponds to the high dependence from 
food imports. Both manufactures imports and exports for G-90 represent a low percentage of 
total imports and exports compared to other groups, confirming that G-90 and G-33 include 
the most vulnerable economies in the world. 
Looking at trade polices, G-90 and G-33 have the highest average bound tariffs (POAVBD) 
and the US the lowest. In the case of the G-10, a rather high average tariff value is coupled 
with a high variance of bound tariffs (POVRBD), showing a larger dispersion of tariff 
structure, which increases the impact on trade flows. On the contrary, Cairns Group has a low 
variance of bound tariffs, showing a more homogeneous structure of tariff lines. 
As far as the “water in the tariffs” issue is concerned, i.e. the difference between bound and 
applied tariffs, G-90 and G-33 present the largest values of this indicator (POWAT). Finally, 
considering the export side, G-20 and Cairns Group face the highest (bound) tariffs on their 
agricultural exports, and this is consistent with their request for a liberalization of world 
agricultural markets. 
In order to give a more general overview of the coherence (or similarity) degree within each 
coalition, we have built a synthetic index as the sum of the variances for each indicator for the 
specified groups (Table 3). Looking at the sum of variances for the all sample of indicators, it 
is worth noting that the G-20 seems to have a higher internal cohesion compared to the other 
group. Looking at specific characteristics, G-20 has quite the same value for all the five 
dimensions, while the other groups are more heterogeneous. Also the other “exporting group” 
(Cairns Group) presents a rather high degree of internal cohesion, though it is more 
heterogeneous in terms of the development dimension.   14
 
Table 3 – Sum of Variances for effective coalitions 
Dimensions 
Coalitions  Total Economic  Development Agriculture Trade  Trade  Policy
G-90  30.51 6.14  4.92 7.45  9.22 2.76 
G-20  21.17 4.50  4.10 4.38  5.30 2.88 
CAIRNS  23.74 3.77  7.71 5.67  5.22 1.36 
G-10  37.19 3.54  5.75  13.85  4.84 9.21 
G-33  27.55 5.46  4.12 6.07  8.02 3.88 
EU-25  22.08 3.68  3.63 7.76  7.01 0.00 
Note: values of variances calculated on the basis of z-scores values for each indicator 
 
The situation of the other groups is more contrasted. The G-90, for example, has high 
variance for trade, and low for trade policy. On the contrary, G-10 has low variance for trade 
and high for trade policy, mainly due to the variable related to variance of bound tariffs 
(POVRBD). G-10 countries present similar values regarding the economic dimension, but 
register great differences in the structure of the agricultural sector. These results fly into the 
face of the comments forecasting a short life for the G-20 coalition after Cancún. According 
to this interpretation, the G-20 only shared the opposition to the EU-US joint proposal of 
August 2003, with no other scope for real cooperation after Cancún. Our data suggest a rather 
different story, confirming the cohesion that this group has showed after Cancún. 
 
4.2  Correlation analysis among indicators  
Since our analysis is based upon a plurality of indicators for each dimension, the presence of 
collinear variables within the same dimension needs to be preliminarily checked to prevent a 
bias in the clustering procedure. We have therefore analyzed all the selected indicators 
(Appendix A, Table A5, A6, A7, A8) in order to select the most appropriate and statistically 
significant variables for the cluster analysis.
15 As a general rule we dropped all the variables 
which showed a statistically significant Pearson correlation index with any other variables 
unless specific theoretical considerations suggested to keep the variable anyway.  
Apparently, within the economic and development dimensions, the three income related 
indices (GDPCPL, GDPCPG, and GDPTOG) are highly correlated. Since GDPCPL seems to 
be correlated with most of the development indices, it was eliminated. Between the two 
remaining indices, we maintain the total GDP growth rate (GDPTOG) because it is less 
correlated with the other development issues (i.e., foreign direct investments, growth of 
internet users, food security indicators). Finally, the government expenditures were dropped 
due to high correlation with FDI, health expenditures and household consumption. 
On the development side, the education index is highly correlated with all other development 
indicators, and the same is true for the number of internet users. The index of calories per 
capita (DCALCAP) was dropped due to its high correlation with the other two indices for 
food security and with other development variables (DHEAEXP and DINTERG). Even if the 
other development indices are also positively related, we chose to retain them in order to 
represent the economic and development dimensions with a number of indicators at least 
equal to that used for the other ones. 
Coming to the agricultural dimension, four out of ten variables (rural population – AGRUR, 
cereal yields per hectare – AGCER, agricultural value added per hectare – AGVALA, and 
                                                 
15 The variable “total unemployment” has been excluded from the correlation analysis due to data gap for too 
many countries, impossible to replace using regional averages.   15
fertilizer consumption – AGFERT) were not considered in the cluster analysis due to their 
high correlation. Other indices present high correlation values, but they were maintained in 
order to fully represent productivity and technical innovation in agriculture. 
In the case of trade flows and policy, correlations are less common, but still significant in 
some obvious (i.e., the agriculture share and the manufacture share in total export) and less 
obvious cases (i.e., the average tariffs faced on agricultural exports and the share of 
manufacture trade in total trade). However, none of the variables was dropped in order to 
avoid a major imbalance between the number of trade related variables and the number of 
variables related to the structural dimensions (economic system, development and 
agriculture). The only exception is the variable POPMS, which was excluded due to the high 
correlation with POAVHG, and for the problems mentioned above. 
 
4.3  “Natural” bargaining coalitions from cluster analysis 
In this section we comment upon the results of the cluster analysis. As discussed in Section 3, 
these results provide a map for the counterfactual (“natural”) bargaining coalitions that WTO 
members would form on the basis of their structural similarity, which, in turn, we suppose to 
be the key factor in the formation of their “true” preferences for the negotiation outcome. In 
the following, we firstly discuss the structure of the groups produced by the cluster analysis, 
and then we compare “natural” and “actual” coalitions. 
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the coalitions membership projected onto a 
geographical map. The north-south divide is immediately apparent with few interesting 
exceptions. Developed countries are grouped together into three coalitions corresponding to 
the traditional Quad: the US-Canada Group, the EU with some of its neighbours, and the G-
10. 
Other coalitions mainly include countries from the developing world, thus confirming a 
strong geographical pattern in the formation of negotiating collective actors. It is worth 
noticing a few exceptions, as in the case of Turkey and Romania. These countries present 
structural features closer to the developing countries, but their “geo-political proximity” to the 
EU strongly influences their actual negotiating position. The Figure also confirms the 
“African core” of the G-90 group by contrast with the more inter-continental vocation of the 
G-20. Tables 4, 5 and 6 show a more in-depth analysis of the “natural” bargaining coalition 
and of their “milieu” of interests. 
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G-20 (Cluster 3)  CAIRNS (Cluster 4 and 5)  EU (Cluster 7)  US (Cluster 8)  G-90 (Cluster 1 and 2)  G-10 (Cluster 6)   17 
Table 4 – Groups from cluster analysis 
G-90 G-20  CAIRNS G-10  EU-25  USA 
Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5  Cluster 6  Cluster 7  Cluster 8 
Albania  Madagascar Angola  Bolivia  South  Africa  Argentina  Malaysia  Japan  Bulgaria  Canada 
Armenia  Malawi  Antigua and Barbuda  Botswana Sri  Lanka  Australia Thailand  Korea,  Rep.  Croatia  US 
Bangladesh Mali  Barbados  Brazil  Tunisia  New Zealand    Switzerland  Macedonia   
Benin Mauritania  Belize  Chile  Turkey  Uruguay   Norway Moldova   
Burkina Faso  Mozambique  Congo, Rep. China  Venezuela       EU-25   
Burundi Nepal  Djibouti  Colombia  Zambia          
Cambodia Niger  Dominica  Costa  Rica  Zimbabwe           
Cameroon Nigeria  Fiji  Dominican Rep.           
Central Afr. Rep.  Pakistan  Grenada Ecuador             
Chad Papua  N.G.  Guyana  El  Salvador            
Congo Dem. Rep.  Rwanda  Jamaica  Gabon           
Cote d'Ivoire  Senegal  Jordan  Guatemala            
Egypt. Tanzania  Kuwait Honduras           
The Gambia   Togo  Lesotho  Indonesia             
Georgia  Uganda Mauritius  Mexico             
Ghana   Mongolia Morocco           
Guinea   Nicaragua Namibia           
Guinea-Bissau    St. Kitts and Nevis  Panama           
Haiti   St.  Lucia  Paraguay            
India    St. Vincent and the Gr.  Peru             
Kenya   Swaziland  Philippines             
Kyrgyz Rep.    Trinidad and Tobago  Romania           
Notes: in italics countries from different existing coalitions based on official WTO documents (WTO, 2004). 
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Cluster1  37 685.81  4.31  4.09  7.60 
Cluster2  22 449.30  4.52  4.20  8.15 
Cluster3  29 385.64  3.65  3.49  6.39 
Cluster4  4 27.65  2.63 2.62  2.80 
Cluster5  2 17.12  2.93 2.93  2.93 
Cluster6  4 83.66  4.57 4.49  5.46 
Cluster7  5 51.18  3.20 3.09  4.26 
Cluster8  2 5.23  1.62 1.62  1.62 
 
G-90 - The G-90 is represented in our analysis by two different clusters, thus reproducing the 
“multifaceted” composition of this group, which is, in fact, the sum of three groups: African 
Union (AU), Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP). 
However, it should be noted that these two sub-groups show quite a degree of similarity, as 
shown by the values of “within cluster standard deviation”, “average” and “maximum 
distance from centroid” (Table 5). Cluster 1 (whose components are listed in Table 4) 
includes mainly the African Group members within the G-90, while in cluster 2 are grouped a 
variety of mainly non-African countries which are mostly members of the ACP group and/or 
of the G-33. These results suggest that the very large alliance named G-90 is the sum of 
similar but not identical interests. Both clusters forming the G-90 are less homogenous than 
all other clusters, thus emphasizing the relative lack of coherence of this large coalition with 
respect to the others. 
Countries included in a certain group on the basis of the cluster analysis but actually members 
of a different coalition are showed in italics in Table 4. As already mentioned, this 
“misclassification” may be a clue for a country’s weaker commitment to its actual group’s 
position. According to its structural features, such a country is expected to be “naturally” 
inclined towards the positions of its most similar group (i.e. the one identified by the cluster 
analysis). 
One of the most relevant “misclassification” cases within the G-90 clusters is represented by 
India. This important country, as a matter of fact, emerged in Cancún as one of the leading 
members of the G-20, asking for relevant multilateral liberalization efforts from the 
developed countries. Nevertheless, such a position was not fully consistent with the previous 
statements from the Indian government, since they were mostly concerned with the special 
and differential treatment for developing countries (Narlikar and Tussie, 2004). These 
positions were broadly consistent with the G-90 negotiating attitude and India, indeed, is 
classified by the cluster analysis in this group. The convergence of interests between India 
and other G-20 members must then be explained on political grounds: the Indian government 
probably thought that it was preferable to take the offensive, putting the spotlight on the 
policy implemented by the developed countries rather than on those implemented by the 
developing countries. Moreover, the political relevance of India is certainly enhanced by the 
fact that many “G-90” countries acknowledge that the problems faced by the Indian 
agricultural sector and policy are not very different from those faced by their own economies. 
G-20 - Cluster 3, with the exception of India, provides a remarkably accurate representation 
of the G-20. This cluster shows a relatively high internal cohesion (Table 5), so that the 
cluster centroids effectively summarize the group’s structural features. In terms of 
“misclassifications”, it is worth underlining the inclusion of two EU candidate countries:   19
Romania and Turkey. As it was already mentioned, this could be considered a typical 
example of the existence of “side-payments” (i.e., benefits not directly related to multilateral 
trade) influencing the actual alliances. 
CAIRNS - The Cairns Group is represented by two different clusters (cluster 4 and 5 in Table 
4). This shows a potential divide within the group, with Malaysia and Thailand so distant 
from the other countries’ interests to form a separate group (cluster 5). The results suggest 
that the “core” of the group is to be found in cluster 4. An interesting feature of the actual 
Cairns Group is that several of its affiliated is also members of other negotiating coalitions. 
This behaviour is consistent with our results, since clusters 4 and 5 are the second nearest 
clusters of several Cairns Group members included in different clusters (see Table 8). This is 
the case of Brazil, South Africa and the Philippines, which are included in the counterfactual 
(as well as in the actual) G-20, or Canada in the case of the “US cluster”. In the present round, 
the Cairns Group has played a rather minor role in comparison with the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. An obvious explanation is provided by the small number of countries included 
in cluster 4. These countries, which can be considered the “core” of the Cairns Group are very 
homogeneous (Table 5 shows a relative low dispersion around the centroid of the cluster), but 
they lack the political clout of the “larger” Cairns Group. 
G-10 - The cluster analysis representation of the G-10 may be biased by the lack of data for 
many of its components. However, cluster 6 is able to include the majority of its main actors 
even if the cluster is less compact than other groups (Table 5), since an average distance from 
the group’s centroid is accompanied by a relatively standard deviation within the cluster. 
EU-25 and US - The EU-25 and the US do not join any coalition, but they are big enough to 
attract other countries in their “own” clusters. For the EU this happens for Bulgaria and 
Croatia (candidates for accession), as well as for Macedonia and Moldova (both signatories of 
the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation between EU and 
South East European countries). It should also be recalled that the EU-25 (i.e., after the 
enlargement) is much more similar to these countries than what would have been the case for 
the EU-15 (i.e., before the enlargement). It is worth noting, as shown again in Table 5, that 
this aggregation is far from being homogeneous, though relatively more “compact” than other 
existing coalitions. The US is grouped with Canada, and this is hardly surprising.
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4.4  A map for the negotiation: the relative position of the bargaining coalitions 
In addition to the group’s membership, cluster analysis allows a better understanding of the 
relative position of the different groups. Table 6 presents the Euclidean distances between 
clusters’ centroids. The clusters are defined in an n-dimensional space, thus making all bi-
dimensional representation of their reciprocal distances impossible. However, Figure 2 
provides a (partial) graphical representation of the distances between the clusters. The Figure 
shows the distances of all cluster centroids from a common benchmark (a vector of zeros) on 
the x-axis and the distances of each country/observation from its cluster centroid (on the y-
axis). The y-axis, then, provides a scatter of the within-group distribution, thus offering a 
visual representation of clusters’ homogeneity. In addition, this scatter allows the 
identification of outliers in the distribution: those countries which show more extreme values 
within the group - i.e. which are more distant from the cluster centroid – are less 
homogeneous with the rest of the group and, consequently, less committed to its positions. 
Two dimensions do not allow to ensure proportionality between each bilateral distance 
(reported in Table 6), nonetheless Figure 2 graphically (though not accurately) shows, on the 
x-axis, the great divide within the Doha Round. The G-90 and the G-20 are globally “close” to 
                                                 
16 For further details on descriptive statistics for clusters, see Appendix A, Table A9, A10, A11, A12.   20
each other, but very “distant” from other groups. As it was already mentioned, the clusters 
forming the G-90 are very close to each other in the Euclidean space. Cluster 3 (representing 
the G-20) is the next closest cluster to both the sub-groups. This suggest the possibility of 
defining (at least) some common positions in the negotiations, creating a large front of 
developing countries balancing the political ad economic power of the developed countries. 
 
Table 6 – Proximity matrix: distances between cluster centres 
  Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Cluster5 Cluster6 Cluster7 Cluster8
Cluster1  0 3.98 3.27 7.51 7.28 8.29 5.74 9.27
Cluster2  3.98 0 3.45 7.36 5.89 7.62 4.72 8.59
Cluster3  3.27 3.45 0 5.56 5.33 6.59  4.26  7.25
Cluster4  7.51 7.36 5.56 0 7.21 7.70 5.92 5.08
Cluster5  7.28 5.89 5.33 7.21 0 7.76 5.76 7.82
Cluster6  8.29 7.62 6.59 7.70 7.76 0 6.27 6.92
Cluster7  5.74 4.72 4.26 5.92 5.76 6.27  0 6.66
Cluster8  9.27 8.59 7.25 5.08 7.82 6.92 6.66  0
 
Cluster 7 (including the EU) is relatively closer to both G-90 and G-20 than all other clusters. 
This is rather surprising if we look at the policy issues, but it can be explained on a structural 
ground, taking into account the consequences of the most recent enlargement. In point of fact, 
the new EU members are characterized by agricultural structures and an overall development 
level which make the EU-25 a bit less different from the developing world than the EU-15. If 
such a change may influence the EU position in the WTO negotiations remains a moot point. 
With respect to the clusters forming the G-90, the USA-Canada group is the more remote, 
together with the G-10 group. 
Table 7 shows the second nearest cluster for each country. This provides a clue for the most 
likely alternative coalition in case of defection from actual group. The most remarkable 
information from this exercise is that for countries in the G-90 the only feasible alternative is 
the G-20 and vice versa. The same reasoning applies to the developed countries’ coalitions as 
a whole, thus confirming the significant divide between developed and developing countries.  
In addition, it is worth noting that when countries have an overlapping membership, the 
“second membership” is often consistent with the “second nearest cluster” (e.g., in the case of 
the Philippines or Brazil). This confirms the capability of our analysis to represent some 
interesting features of the “real world”. 
Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the distribution of the countries according to the 
differential distance between the centroid of their second nearest cluster and that of their own 
cluster. The higher this difference, the closer the country is to its own cluster centroid 
relatively to other potential alternatives. Symmetrically, the lower the difference, the higher 
the relative proximity to the second nearest cluster (for numerical details, see Appendix A, 
Table A13). Thus, countries showing relatively lower values are, in comparison to the others, 
more “attracted” by the “second best” coalition. This is for example the case of India, Egypt 
and Nigeria, grouped in cluster 1 (G-90) but also relatively closer to cluster 3 (G-20) than to 
all other countries included in cluster 1. 
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Figure 3 – Difference in distance between second nearest cluster and own cluster centroid. 
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Table 7 – Second nearest cluster 
Cluster  Second 
nearest  Countries 




Albania, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, 
Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Uganda 
Cluster 1  Lesotho, St. Lucia, Congo, Rep., Djibouti 
Cluster 3 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Fiji 
Cluster 2 
Cluster 7  Barbados  
Cluster 1 
Bolivia, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, Sri Lanka, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Cluster 2  Botswana, Chile, Gabon, Honduras, Namibia, Tunisia, Venezuela 
Cluster 4  Brazil  
Cluster 5  Philippines  
Cluster 3 
Cluster 7  Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Romania, South Africa, Turkey 
Cluster 3  Argentina, Uruguay 
Cluster 4 
Cluster 8  Australia, New Zealand 
Cluster 2  Malaysia 
Cluster 5 
Cluster 3  Thailand 
Cluster 3  Korea Rep. 
Cluster 7  Japan, Switzerland  Cluster 6 
Cluster 8  Norway 
Cluster 2  Macedonia 
Cluster 3  Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova  Cluster 7 
Cluster 8  EU-25 
Cluster 8  Cluster 4  Canada, USA 
 
 
4.5  Driving factors of “natural” bargaining coalitions 
In this subsection we focus on the variables providing a more apparent contribution to the 
formation of clusters. In particular, the values of some “cluster centroids” vectors (Table 8) 
are commented together with the distribution of individual countries’ values around their 
group’s mean (Figures 4-7). This sheds some light on the structural features of the “natural” 
coalitions, and the comparison of these results with those regarding the “actual coalitions” 
(see section 4.1) makes clear the similarities among the two groups. Moreover, this analysis 
provides some clues on the contribution of these factors in differentiating the groups.   24
Table 8 – Cluster output: cluster centroids 
Variable  Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 Cluster4 Cluster5 Cluster6 Cluster7 Cluster8 
GDPTOG  0.044 -0.029  0.165 -0.367 0.847 -0.303 -0.980  0.057
GINFLRT  -0.059 -0.114  0.368 -0.334 -0.462 -0.527 -0.128 -0.484
GFDIGDP  -0.390 0.968  -0.190 -0.363 -0.124 -0.463 0.491 -0.126
DHEAEXP  -0.717 0.133 0.036 1.617 -0.741 1.495 1.473 2.115
DINTERG  0.320 0.049  -0.121 -0.562 -0.444 -0.618 -0.471 -0.730
DFOOCAP  -0.490 -0.217 -0.025 3.815 0.079 0.115 0.653  2.256
DFOOIMP  -0.590 -0.440  0.252 1.524 3.059 1.674 0.275  1.960
AGVA  1.072 -0.547 -0.466 -0.930 -0.662 -1.185 -0.391 -1.201
AGEMP  0.643 0.030  -0.178 0.115 -0.499 -1.631 -2.059  -0.970
AGLAND  0.204 -0.233 -0.228 -0.494 0.211 -0.293 1.458 -0.190
AGVAWR  -0.415 -0.106 -0.271 1.387 -0.176 1.946 0.478  5.087
AGWRHA  0.420 0.100  -0.225 -0.831 -0.133 -0.501 -0.780 -0.874
AGMACH  -0.301 -0.090 -0.202 0.029 -0.033 4.136 0.469  0.009
TAGIEVA  -0.512 1.037  -0.232 0.245 0.040 0.028 0.285 0.141
TAGIMTI  0.636 0.136  -0.403 -0.994 -1.162 -0.975 -0.431 -1.236
TAGEXTE  0.317 -0.311 -0.114 0.900 -0.468 -0.887 0.109 -0.613
TAGSTB  0.145 0.416  -0.232 -1.748 -0.972 1.119 -0.445  -0.547
TEXPGDP  -0.585 1.079  -0.224 -0.718 2.791 -0.098 0.596  -0.446
TIMPGDP  -0.379 1.266  -0.418 -1.053 1.608 -0.719 0.748  -0.796
TMANIMP  -0.785 -0.062  0.672 1.366 1.269 0.452 -0.307  1.312
TMANEXP  -0.395 -0.153  0.195 -0.257 1.259 1.213 0.737  1.147
TCOMEXP  0.062 0.319  -0.275 -0.461 -0.015 -0.033 0.010 0.296
POAVBD  0.106 0.548  -0.058 -0.876 -0.687 -0.489 -1.038 -1.136
POVRBD  -0.174 -0.133  0.115 -0.458 -0.223 2.597 -0.286 -0.318
POWAT  0.117 0.590  -0.059 -0.760 -0.589 -1.046 -1.017 -1.055
POAVHG  -0.483 -0.485  0.388 1.227 1.583 0.690 0.403  2.215
 
Table 8 presents the centroid vector of each cluster, including the mean of each variable 
considered. These are the values underlying the differences across clusters showed by the 
following figures. 
Considering the economic dimension, Figure 4 provides an indication of the dispersion of the 
values within the clusters (the values for the variance are included in Appendix A, Table A9-
A12). Growth of income per capita (GDPTOG) and foreign direct investments (GFDIGDP) 
(the values for each cluster are shown in Table 8) are the most differentiated variables. In both 
cases the mean values for the eight clusters are quite different, and for the FDI there are 
several outliers in three out of the eight clusters formed exclusively by developing countries. 
The clusters including the developing countries - clusters 1, 2 and 3 - show a larger 
variability, though it should be recalled that these clusters also include a larger number of 
observations. Considering the inflation rate (GINFLRT), the divergence among clusters is 
lower than for other economic variables, but in some cases (see for example the G-20) a 
relative high variance is due to the presence of several outliers. 
On the development side, Figure 5 includes variables such as health expenditures per capita 
(DHEAEXP), internet users growth (DINTERG) or food security (DFOOIMP). Cluster 3 (G-
20) denotes a relatively higher variability of health expenditures, and this reflects different 
approaches to the welfare state in the developing world. The growth of internet users shows 
some dynamism by developing countries, especially for Cluster 1 (African Union) and Cluster 
3 (G-20). The food security index, defined here as the ratio of total exports to food imports,   25
makes clear the difference between net food importing countries (mainly clusters 1 and 2) and 
relatively food secure countries, such as clusters 4 and 5 (Cairns Group) or cluster 8 (USA). 
In terms of intra-groups variability, cluster 6 (G-10) has a high internal variance, while the 
developing countries (clusters 1, 2 and 3) show values closer to the mean. 
 

















































































   26
The diagram regarding the agricultural variables (Figure 6) confirms that developing 
countries are highly dependent on the primary sector, with labour-intensive production 
techniques and low capital investments. As a matter of fact, clusters 1, 2 and 3 show a 
relatively lower decrease in agricultural employment (AGEMP) and a low productivity of 
labour factor (value added per worker, AGVAWR), with quite a great similarity between and 
within the clusters. It is with respect to these variables that the two clusters “representing” the 
G-90 are more differentiated from the others: both sub-groups are significantly far from the 
other clusters, while cluster 1 (including most of the African countries) is more characterized 
by a crucial role of agriculture in the economy and foreign trade. 
Figure 7 presents the results for the trade variables. Cluster 4 (Cairns Group) stands as the 
most export-oriented group, and this is true for each of its members, with high ratios of 
agricultural exports (TAGEXTE) and negative values (implying larger exports than imports) 
of the standardized agricultural trade balance (TAGSTB). On the contrary, the other export-
oriented group (cluster 3 – G-20) seems much more differentiated in this respect, and this may 
explain the doubts raised on the sustainability of this coalition. Countries of cluster 6 (G-10) 
are all net agricultural importers, but some of them are net exporters for manufactures. These 
results confirm the great divergence among clusters on the trade side, and the convergence 
within homogeneous groups such as cluster 4 (Cairns). 
Finally, trade policy variables (Figure 8) offer additional evidence of the internal cohesion of 
clusters 4 and 5 (Cairns Group), including countries imposing low tariffs on imports 
(POAVBD) and facing high tariffs (POAVHG) on exports. On the contrary, clusters 1 and 2 
(G-90) are rather scattered around an average value for import tariffs close to the general 
mean. “G-20” countries are rather similar in terms of protection, but face quite different tariffs 
in the foreign markets, with an average close to those of the clusters 4 and 5. Finally, it is 
worth noting the cluster 6 (G-10) countries present very different levels of protection, as 
shown by variance of bound tariffs (POVRBD). 
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5.  Conclusions 
The paper aims to deliver new quantitative insights into the “sustainability” of the existing 
bargaining coalitions in the current WTO agricultural negotiation, as also into their coherence 
with the interests of each actor. Our methodology, by offering a global view on the 
negotiations, overcomes one of the limitations of the existing analyses which are focused on 
individual coalitions as case studies. 
In this paper we have been able not only to highlight the milieu of interest of the existing 
bargaining coalitions, but also to show the relative position of the negotiating actors with 
respect to the core of their coalitions. Cluster analysis, in this context, has proven to be able to 
provide a consistent “map” of the ongoing negotiation, of the similarities of the actors in 
terms of their structural features and, consequently, of their preferences for the final 
negotiation outcome. Overall this analysis provides a base-line scenario for a dynamic 
assessment of the evolution of the negotiation coalitions, also showing the room for, and 
discussing the possibility of, new “potential” coalitions. In this sense the analysis has been 
able to “detect” the existence of “potential defectors” in each existing coalition also showing 
the alternative coalitions which may more “naturally” accommodate these countries. These 
potential alternative coalitions may concentrate a certain pressure on such potential defectors 
in order to gain their support in the final evolutions of the current negotiation round. 
Furthermore, the empirical results confirm our research hypotheses about the role of 
countries’ structural features in the formation of bargaining coalitions thus providing 
empirical support for the use of such structural features as proxies for countries’ preferences. 
This finding may prove particularly promising in order to pursue further research on the 
formation of bargaining coalitions in the WTO. While cluster analysis allowed us to 
understand the features of each coalition and the relative position of its components, the 
relative importance of each factor is not directly addressed. Thus, further research should be 
focused on a more formal analysis of the relative contribution of each factor towards the 
chance, for a negotiating actor, to join a certain coalition or not. This further empirical 
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Table A1 – General set of indicators 
Dimension Categories  Indicators  Years  Data  Source  Code 
General  GDP per capita (level, 1995 US$ PPP)  1998-2002 WDI GDPCPL Economic 
System    GDP per capita growth (annual % average last ten years)  1992-2002 WDI GDPCPG
    GDP growth (annual % average last ten years)  1992-2002 WDI GDPTOG
    Inflation rate  1998-2002 WDI GINFLRT
  Openness  Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)  1998-2002 WDI GFDIGDP
   Institutions  General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)  1998-2002 WDI GOVEXP
Development Human well-being  Education index (average gross enrolment ratio)  1996-2000 WDI-UNDP DEDUIND
    Health expenditure, public (% of GDP)  1997-2001 WDI DHEAEXP
    Household consumption (% of GDP)  1998-2002 WDI DHOUCON
  Labour force  Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)  1997-2001 WDI-ILO DUNEMP
  Innovation and Technology  Internet users (per 1,000 people)  1998-2002 WDI DINTERLV
    Internet users (% change)  1998-2002 WDI DINTERG
  Food security  Calories per capita  1993-1997 Diaz-Bonilla 2000 DCALCAP
    Food production per capita  1993-1997 Diaz-Bonilla 2000 DFOOCAP
      Total exports/Food imports  1993-1997 Diaz-Bonilla 2000 DFOOIMP
Agriculture  General  Agriculture, Value Added (% GDP)  1998-2002 WDI AGVA
    Employment in agriculture as % of total employment (% change)  1992-2002 FAO AGEMP
    Rural population (% of total population)  2002 WDI AGRUR
    Land use, arable land (% of land area)  2001 WDI AGLAND
  Productivity  Cereal yield (kg per hectare)  1998-2002 WDI AGCER
    Agricultural value added per worker  2002 WDI-FAO AGVAWR
    Agri v.a/ (Land use, arable land (hectares)  2002 WDI AGVALA
    Workers in agri/ hectar  2002 FAO AGWRHA
  Technical innovation  Agricultural machinery, tractors per 100 hectares of arable land  2001 WDI AGMACH
      Fertilizer consumption (100 grams per hectare of arable land)  2002 WDI AGFERT
Trade  Agriculture  (Agri imp + Agri exp)/ agri V.A.  2000-2002 WDI-FAO TAGIEVA
    Agri imp/total imp  2000-2002 WDI-FAO TAGIMTI
    Agri exp/Total exp  2000-2002 WDI-FAO TAGEXTE
    (Imp-Exp)/(Imp+Exp) 2000-2002 WDI-FAO TAGSTB
  General  Exports, tot (% of GDP)  1998-2002 WDI TEXPGDP
    Imports, tot (% of GDP)  1998-2002 WDI TIMPGDP
    Manif imp/total imp  1997-2001 WDI TMANIMP
    Manif exp/Total exp  1997-2001 WDI TMANEXP
      Computer, communications and other serv. (% Total. exp.)  1997-2001 WDI TCOMEXP
Trade Policy  Import Own tariffs  Average bound tariff (weighted with import flows)  2002* UNCTAD-TRAINS POAVBD
    Variance of bound tariff (simple)  2002* UNCTAD-TRAINS POVRBD
    Water in tariffs weighted with import flows (BND-MFN)  2002* UNCTAD-TRAINS POWAT
  Import Foreign tariffs  Average Highest Applied MFN 2002* UNCTAD-TRAINS POAVHG
      Preference Margin Simple (MFN-AHS)  2002* UNCTAD-TRAINS POPMS
Notes: * where not available, replaced with values referred to last available year 
Legend: G= General Economic;  D=Development;  AG=Agriculture;  TAG=Trade Agriculture;  T=Trade General;  PO=Trade Policy  33
Table A2– Summary statistics for existing coalitions: Economic system and development 
Indicators  Statistics G-90  G-20 CAIRNS G-10  G-33  EU  25 
GDPCPL Range  13243.03  10252.92 22968.37 26209.40 13243.03 20259.59 
 Mean  3014.84  4771.10 8773.71 18333.90 4061.45  17866.39 
  Coef.  Var.  2730.92 1454.53 5398.85 5904.63 2876.18 2317.71 
GDPCPG Range  8.8062 10.5726 9.2727 3.7156 11.0042  7.0365 
  Mean  1.0784 1.4548 1.8908 1.9934 1.5532 2.9400 
  Coef.  Var.  3.4678 3.0290 2.2657 0.9267 3.1496 0.7819 
GDPTOG  Range  9.2084 9.5771 9.0559 4.3231 9.9769 7.8954 
  Mean  3.2000 3.3206 3.5288 2.3836 3.3984 3.0927 
  Coef.  Var.  1.0863 1.1140 1.1392 1.3052 1.2804 0.8333 
GINFLRT Range  72.4682  73.0586 21.6526 9.3468 73.0586  8.5682 
 Mean  9.3021  11.8397 5.9637 3.5386 9.5472  3.3879 
 Coef.  Var.  27.4631  23.1033 4.0437 3.3708 21.9106  1.6628 
GFDIGDP Range  21.4218  9.9227 9.9227 5.4618 21.5066  20.9403 
  Mean  4.3534 3.0053 3.3308 2.6035 4.4165 6.4906 
  Coef.  Var.  5.4844 1.4938 1.5026 1.6278 3.9989 3.8722 
GOVEXP  Range  35.4150 14.5740 14.5740 8.4842 23.9737 17.2153 
  Mean  15.1328 12.8227 14.0271 15.5024 14.3060 19.8704 
  Coef.  Var.  3.3621 1.4345 1.3332 0.6747 1.8897 0.6625 
DEDUIND  Range  0.6860 0.5482 0.5929 0.3265 0.6460 0.3212 
  Mean  0.4665 0.6221 0.7064 0.7916 0.5511 0.8523 
  Coef.  Var.  0.0602 0.0307 0.0298 0.0202 0.0473 0.0112 
DHEAEXP  Range  4.3982 4.3200 5.8200 4.9600 4.6400 4.2200 
  Mean  2.5377 2.6198 3.4753 4.4558 2.6017 5.6333 
  Coef.  Var.  0.4396 0.5887 0.8350 0.9321 0.4734 0.1907 
DHOUCON Range  69.0105  42.1116 41.5465 24.2872 55.3296 21.4500 
  Mean  72.4514 68.5804 64.7102 57.9663 67.5839 58.0069 
  Coef.  Var.  2.6891 1.2970 1.7949 1.2248 2.1833 0.6826 
DINTERLV  Range  228.2329 234.0384 495.5337 471.1318 550.3755 439.9696 
 Mean  37.5033  63.4367 163.6263 339.0475 66.1134  308.4937 
  Coef.  Var.  82.9658 49.5088 178.9905 123.0081 144.4038 58.4994 
DINTERG Range  24.2019  11.3893 6.4523 1.6698 14.3333  1.5152 
  Mean  4.6941 2.9951 1.6488 0.7421 3.1367 0.7462 
  Coef.  Var.  6.1587 2.4609 1.6164 0.4353 3.4257 0.2457 
DCALCAP Range  1537.00  1176.00 1184.00 489.00 1795.00  912.00 
  Mean  2348.96 2619.87 2759.83 3060.00 2433.45 3278.96 
 Coef.  Var.  63.6808  36.9282 38.7651 13.4348 60.8979 19.1350 
DFOOCAP  Range  334.700 502.300 894.700 177.700 334.700 880.700 
  Mean  121.877 193.926 349.694 202.317 136.565 391.817 
  Coef.  Var.  32.0403 65.3018 198.006 33.3725 31.0436 114.849 
DFOOIMP Range  22.5000  59.1000 56.3000 36.7000 37.5000 29.0000 
  Mean  8.3719 17.3609 23.0056 25.2333 11.6000 19.7958 
  Coef.  Var.  2.9988 8.4933 8.7462 6.8972 5.0630 2.9289 
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Table A3– Summary statistics for existing coalitions: Agriculture 
Indicators  Statistics G-90  G-20 CAIRNS G-10  G-33  EU  25 
AGVA Range  58.3465  31.6962 20.3131 13.9382 43.0936  7.1210 
 Mean  24.5244  14.3307 11.0684 5.3199 17.5956  3.7783 
  Coef.  Var.  9.6890 4.5833 3.4620 5.4346 7.4751 0.8513 
AGEMP Range  34.2098 26.6009 26.0582 24.8222 42.6910 48.0096 
  Mean  -11.2021 -17.2819 -17.7224 -36.1496 -15.7974 -31.5678 
 Coef.  Var.  -6.4207  -3.3579 -3.6416 -3.3196 -6.7891 -3.0933 
AGRUR Range  73.1740 61.8280 60.6700 36.9220 74.8720 46.2920 
  Mean  61.9569 43.0811 34.1868 33.3343 54.6928 29.3517 
  Coef.  Var.  4.7147 8.5899 11.3622 5.0376 4.6053 5.3685 
AGLAND Range  62.0679  51.9806 26.9383 46.3931 53.8904 47.4735 
  Mean  14.2504 13.9117 9.3715 21.9896 15.1974 27.1182 
 Coef.  Var.  13.1614  12.2970 4.9588 15.3473 10.6203  6.9519 
AGCER  Range  6982.40 6024.70 4650.76 3894.13 6626.86 6010.60 
  Mean  1658.84 2932.96 3182.94 5377.69 2171.11 4589.71 
  Coef.  Var.  1067.59 626.75 465.80 484.39 1021.79 780.54 
AGVAWR Range  20277.39  6777.14 41660.53 26650.12 20277.39  40842.42 
 Mean  1553.88  1953.44 7420.60 15593.27 2145.16  19937.59 
 Coef.  Var.  5480.58  1422.62 17754.95 7131.28 5554.12  10099.92 
AGVALA Range  18101.58  5444.57 5460.65 12521.19 12531.86 10694.48 
  Mean  1879.19 1601.81 1784.73 6333.08 2114.95 2533.38 
  Coef.  Var.  5820.12 1555.80 1704.17 3998.17 4258.38 2442.79 
AGWRHA  Range  8.7218 3.5392 3.5745 1.2052 4.1365 0.3862 
  Mean  1.8162 1.1544 0.9434 0.4983 1.4545 0.1495 
  Coef.  Var.  1.7280 0.7633 1.1165 0.3878 0.9236 0.0668 
AGMACH Range  3.6547  3.0272 4.8631 45.2543 11.8474  44.0443 
 Mean  0.7514  1.0727 1.4174 16.7857 1.2842  11.0039 
  Coef.  Var.  1.5977 0.7448 1.1933 17.8661 3.3115 8.5423 
AGFERT  Range  6279.52 5644.88 6239.97 3871.78 6270.39 5124.70 
  Mean  777.82 1443.78 1918.67 2622.60 1182.85 1936.64 
 Coef.  Var.  2917.52  1292.09 2106.39 721.99 1875.78  998.85 
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Table A4– Summary statistics for existing coalitions: Trade and Trade policy 
Indicators  Statistics G-90  G-20 CAIRNS G-10  G-33  EU  25 
TAGIEVA Range  7.4193  1.5145 1.9947 2.0716 4.0867  10.3328 
  Mean  1.0198 0.6199 0.9362 1.2233 0.9972 2.8282 
  Coef.  Var.  1.6139 0.2218 0.3308 0.7094 0.9974 2.1828 
TAGIMTI  Range  0.3218 0.1186 0.0893 0.0627 0.2529 0.4161 
  Mean  0.1440 0.0838 0.0668 0.0622 0.1150 0.0841 
  Coef.  Var.  0.0328 0.0139 0.0112 0.0099 0.0279 0.0808 
TAGEXTE  Range  0.8787 0.4109 0.3375 0.1011 0.5075 0.3014 
  Mean  0.1653 0.1570 0.1871 0.0368 0.1278 0.0693 
  Coef.  Var.  0.2131 0.1049 0.0794 0.0518 0.1153 0.0538 
TAGSTB  Range  1.6888 1.5943 1.0908 1.0238 1.6494 1.3971 
 Mean  0.2313  -0.1155 -0.3570 0.4048 0.1492  0.0844 
 Coef.  Var.  0.9117  -1.7063 -0.2202 0.4168 1.1248  1.2806 
TEXPGDP  Range  87.6155 51.5216 107.0439 53.1675 83.6921 72.1811 
  Mean  37.8494 27.7543 35.0014 41.8624 38.4448 50.1255 
  Coef.  Var.  10.9876 6.3720 18.0301 7.4137 9.9164 9.7150 
TIMPGDP Range  90.0606  41.1490 86.0629 54.5922 93.4799 71.6693 
  Mean  46.9034 29.0545 34.1668 38.8525 44.3590 51.2010 
  Coef.  Var.  9.1137 4.9843 11.7311 9.7250 9.3372 9.3530 
TMANIMP Range  66.3789  36.3418 23.3801 26.8916 70.8006 18.3274 
  Mean  61.2617 72.8058 77.6379 69.4919 64.6277 75.8309 
  Coef.  Var.  1.9059 1.2624 0.4921 1.9233 2.0571 0.3160 
TMANEXP Range  89.7923  89.0400 74.4970 69.9627 89.6762 45.0914 
  Mean  30.8636 44.9674 48.6146 72.6233 40.7026 77.6239 
 Coef.  Var.  23.5664  16.9312 11.2921 10.2289 22.7498  1.8836 
TCOMEXP  Range  39.0624 19.2004 19.2004 4.1793 38.8855 11.3115 
  Mean  6.3759 5.5982 5.2092 6.3427 7.3144 7.5060 
  Coef.  Var.  6.4600 5.1366 3.4384 0.4454 6.4007 1.3051 
POAVBD  Range  199.93 179.62 108.35 57.43 187.84 0.0000 
  Mean  73.1159 60.3525 35.7508 41.6231 72.7629 15.1076 
 Coef.  Var.  23.1339  34.5163 19.0048 15.2243 26.0780  0.0000 
POVRBD Range  3298.60  1351.98 727.48 4940.44 4967.07  0.0000 
  Mean  307.30 274.12 161.09 1599.19 354.58 330.33 
  Coef.  Var.  889.07 453.51 291.52 2325.17 2032.17 0.0000 
POWAT Range  190.53  122.2897 97.0673 57.7065 122.2921  0.0000 
 Mean  57.6434  45.6316 26.8386 12.4015 56.1101  0.0000 
 Coef.  Var.  27.2799  31.3308 21.8286 41.3412 27.0434  0.0000 
POAVHG Range  57.4133  84.3474 77.0561 41.0725 70.3120  0.0000 
 Mean  37.7716  65.4266 74.1391 61.5422 47.2321  108.73 
  Coef.  Var.  5.5231 7.9608 6.5724 4.9218 5.4737 0.0000   36 
Table A5 – Correlation matrix: Indicators for Economic system and Development 
Indicators GDPCPL GDPCPG  GDPTOG GINFLRT GFDIGDP GOVEXP DEDUIND DHEAEXP DHOUCON DINTERLV DINTERG DCALCAP DFOOCAP 
GDPCPG  0.196     
  (0.045)     
GDPTOG  0.034 0.870    
  (0.734) (0.000)    
GINFLRT  -0.198 -0.329 -0.327    
  (0.043) (0.001) (0.001)    
GFDIGDP  0.001 0.139 0.043 0.076    
  (0.991) (0.156) (0.660) (0.440)    
GOVEXP  0.227 -0.021 -0.057 0.060 0.412    
  (0.020) (0.831) (0.560) (0.543) (0.000)    
DEDUIND  0.686 0.261 0.003 -0.169 0.081 0.209    
  (0.000) (0.007) (0.977) (0.085) (0.411) (0.032)    
DHEAEXP  0.675 0.051 -0.160 -0.056 0.157 0.444 0.546    
  (0.000) (0.608) (0.104) (0.568) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000)    
DHOUCON  -0.470 -0.250 -0.226 0.014 -0.189 -0.528 -0.448 -0.261  
  (0.000) (0.010) (0.020) (0.890) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007)   
DINTERLV  0.901 0.210 0.034 -0.184 0.034 0.170 0.640 0.604  -0.440  
  (0.000) (0.032) (0.731) (0.060) (0.730) (0.082) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  
DINTERG  -0.325 -0.105 -0.072 0.341 0.091 -0.038 -0.337 -0.207 0.216 -0.277  
  (0.001) (0.287) (0.463) (0.000) (0.354) (0.703) (0.000) (0.034)  (0.027) (0.004)  
DCALCAP  0.687 0.252 0.074 -0.142 -0.081 0.100 0.675 0.439  -0.361 0.641 -0.321  
  (0.000) (0.009) (0.454) (0.149) (0.411) (0.310) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  
DFOOCAP  0.578 0.064 -0.097 -0.096 -0.033 0.087 0.570 0.556  -0.190 0.613 -0.258 0.579  
  (0.000) (0.519) (0.325) (0.332) (0.736) (0.377) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.052) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)  
DFOOIMP  0.635 0.101 0.007 0.024 -0.089 0.039 0.527 0.374  -0.493 0.598 -0.233 0.461 0.504 
  (0.000) (0.306) (0.947) (0.807) (0.367) (0.696) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: p-values in parenthesis 
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Table A6 – Correlation matrix: Indicators for Agriculture 
Indicators AGVA  AGEMP AGRUR AGLAND  AGCER  AGVAWR AGVALA  AGWRHA  AGMACH
AGEMP  0.456      
  (0.000)      
AGRUR  0.661 0.515     
  (0.000) (0.000)     
AGLAND  0.140 -0.184  0.249    
  (0.156) (0.061) (0.010)    
AGCER  -0.414 -0.474 -0.392 0.108    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.271)    
AGVAWR  -0.409 -0.393 -0.471 -0.034 0.468    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.730) (0.000)    
AGVALA  -0.383 -0.201 -0.272 -0.138 0.313 0.188    
  (0.000) (0.040) (0.005) (0.159) (0.001) (0.055)    
AGWRHA  0.216 0.432 0.396 -0.031 -0.072 -0.285 0.397   
  (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.756) (0.465) (0.003) (0.000)   
AGMACH  -0.322 -0.399 -0.257 -0.027 0.486 0.434 0.458  -0.158 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.787) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.107) 
AGFERT  -0.407 -0.289 -0.257 -0.037 0.528 0.226 0.517  0.043  0.299
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.008) (0.705) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000)  (0.664)  (0.002)
Note: p-values in parenthesis 
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Table A7 – Correlation matrix: Indicators for  Trade and Trade Policy 
Indicators TAGIEVA  TAGIMTI  TAGEXTE TAGSTB TEXPGDP TIMPGDP TMANIMP TMANEXP TCOMEXP POAVBD POVRBD POWAT POAVHG
TAGIMTI  0.096  
  (0.329)  
TAGEXTE  -0.157 0.127 
  (0.110) (0.198) 
TAGSTB  0.157 0.383 -0.643
  (0.109) (0.000)  (0.000)
TEXPGDP  0.372 -0.147  -0.258 0.087
  (0.000) (0.133)  (0.008) (0.377)
TIMPGDP  0.319 0.087 -0.081 0.118 0.832
  (0.001) (0.376)  (0.409) (0.229) (0.000)
TMANIMP  0.145 -0.692  -0.065 -0.312 0.151 -0.107
  (0.140) (0.000)  (0.511) (0.001) (0.123) (0.277)
TMANEXP  0.028 -0.313  -0.443 0.160 0.102 -0.028 0.173
  (0.774) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.104) (0.301) (0.777) (0.078)
TCOMEXP  -0.045 -0.006  -0.113 0.050 -0.007 0.104 -0.136 0.119
  (0.648) (0.951)  (0.251) (0.613) (0.940) (0.292) (0.168) (0.225)
POAVBD  0.002 0.049  0.069 0.100 -0.056 0.057 -0.034 -0.146 0.058
  (0.987) (0.622)  (0.486) (0.310) (0.574) (0.560) (0.727) (0.138) (0.559)
POVRBD  -0.019 -0.028  -0.129 0.195 -0.038 -0.103 0.007 0.180 -0.035 0.293
  (0.848) (0.778)  (0.188) (0.046) (0.703) (0.297) (0.944) (0.066) (0.723) (0.002)
POWAT  0.043 0.078  0.093 0.074 -0.044 0.094 -0.014 -0.201 0.050 0.967 0.171
  (0.662) (0.431)  (0.345) (0.452) (0.652) (0.338) (0.885) (0.040) (0.614) (0.000) (0.082)
POAVHG  0.023 -0.558  -0.129 -0.383 -0.035 -0.300 0.524 0.476 0.042 -0.197 0.007 -0.198
  (0.816) (0.000)  (0.188) (0.000) (0.720) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.671) (0.044) (0.940) (0.043)
POPMS  0.179 -0.178  -0.041 -0.191 0.071 -0.016 0.325 0.338 0.059 -0.198 -0.094 -0.184 0.618
  (0.097) (0.459)  (0.113) (0.013) (0.188) (0.153) (0.137) (0.930) (0.416) (0.770) (0.276) (0.233) (0.091)
Note: p-values in parenthesis 
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Table A8 – Correlation matrix for chosen variables in the cluster analysis 
Indicators  GDPTOG GINFLRT GFDIGDP DHEAEXP DINTERG DFOOCAP DFOOIMP  AGVA AGEMP AGLAND AGVAWR AGWRHA AGMACH 
GINFLRT -0.327       
GFDIGDP 0.043  0.076     
DHEAEXP -0.160  -0.056 0.157    
DINTERG -0.072  0.341  0.091 -0.207    
DFOOCAP -0.097  -0.096  -0.033 0.556 -0.258    
DFOOIMP 0.007  0.024  -0.089 0.374 -0.233 0.504    
AGVA -0.102  0.109  -0.232 -0.514 0.355 -0.339 -0.460   
AGEMP 0.202  0.054  -0.096 -0.411 0.238 -0.244 -0.322  0.456  
AGLAND -0.008  -0.010  -0.082 -0.120 -0.075 -0.087 -0.008 0.140 -0.184  
AGVAWR -0.036  -0.146  -0.040 0.623 -0.223 0.593 0.543  -0.409 -0.393 -0.034  
AGWRHA 0.041  0.031  -0.138 -0.272 0.136 -0.347 -0.305 0.216 0.432 -0.031 -0.285  
AGMACH -0.130  -0.117  -0.049 0.403 -0.172 0.120 0.255 -0.322 -0.399 -0.027 0.434 -0.158  
TAGIEVA 0.050  -0.136  0.129 0.281 -0.203 0.044 0.015  -0.465 -0.011 -0.185 0.140 0.110 0.088 
TAGIMTI -0.142  -0.039  -0.133 -0.263 0.260 -0.373 -0.616 0.436 0.385 -0.089 -0.346 0.427 -0.193 
TAGEXTE -0.204  0.085  -0.106 -0.036 -0.003 0.102 -0.176 0.452 0.252 0.020 -0.166 -0.017 -0.194 
TAGSTB 0.112  -0.037  0.092 -0.138 0.159 -0.452 -0.272 -0.081 0.024 0.030 -0.059 0.196 0.190 
TEXPGDP 0.003  0.004  0.347 0.084 -0.045 -0.010 0.153 -0.318 -0.169 -0.124 -0.013 -0.067 -0.003 
TIMPGDP -0.029  -0.034  0.529 0.097 0.097 -0.115 -0.164 -0.094 -0.066 -0.040 -0.158 -0.046 -0.110 
TMANIMP 0.202  0.029  0.048 0.352 -0.270 0.438 0.542  -0.511 -0.268 -0.158 0.370 -0.256 0.080 
TMANEXP 0.192  -0.100  -0.109 0.187 -0.201 0.116 0.235 -0.400 -0.354 0.347 0.249 -0.116 0.345 
TCOMEXP 0.171  -0.054  0.124 0.088 -0.151 0.003 -0.081  -0.016 -0.002 0.066 0.042 0.112 0.045 
POAVBD 0.058  0.184  0.151 -0.209 0.296 -0.318 -0.236  0.120 0.231 0.230 -0.251 0.125 -0.164 
POVRBD 0.001  0.164  -0.131 0.140 0.052 -0.046 0.191  -0.142 -0.226 0.100 0.114 -0.032 0.256 
POWAT 0.084  0.195  0.184 -0.202 0.298 -0.302 -0.265  0.132 0.292 0.184 -0.273 0.142 -0.227 
POAVHG 0.142  -0.090  -0.225 0.269 -0.274 0.467 0.578 -0.453 -0.290 0.024 0.457 -0.186 0.260 
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Table A8 – continued 
Indicators  TAGIEVA TAGIMTI TAGEXTE TAGSTB TEXPGDP TIMPGDP TMANIMP TMANEXP TCOMEXP POAVBD POVRBD POWAT
GINFLRT      
GFDIGDP      
DHEAEXP      
DINTERG      
DFOOCAP      
DFOOIMP      
AGVA      
AGEMP      
AGLAND      
AGVAWR      
AGWRHA      
AGMACH      
TAGIEVA      
TAGIMTI 0.096     
TAGEXTE -0.157  0.127   
TAGSTB 0.157  0.383  -0.643  
TEXPGDP 0.372  -0.147  -0.258 0.087  
TIMPGDP 0.319  0.087  -0.081 0.118 0.832  
TMANIMP 0.145  -0.692  -0.065 -0.312 0.151 -0.107  
TMANEXP 0.028  -0.313  -0.443 0.160 0.102 -0.028 0.173 
TCOMEXP -0.045  -0.006  -0.113 0.050 -0.007 0.104 -0.136 0.119
POAVBD 0.002  0.049  0.069 0.100 -0.056 0.057 -0.034  -0.146 0.058
POVRBD -0.019  -0.028  -0.129 0.195 -0.038 -0.103 0.007 0.180 -0.035 0.293
POWAT 0.043  0.078  0.093 0.074 -0.044 0.094 -0.014  -0.201 0.050 0.967 0.171
POAVHG 0.023  -0.558  -0.129 -0.383 -0.035 -0.300 0.524 0.476 0.042 -0.197 0.007 -0.198
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Table A9 – Summary statistics for clusters: Economic system and development 
   G-90  G-20  CAIRNS  G-10  EU25  US 
Variables Statistics  Cluster  1  Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6  Cluster 7 Cluster 8
GDPTOG Range  9.21  6.02 9.58 3.37 2.34 2.44  7.30 0.17
 Mean  3.23  3.12 3.32 2.24 4.81 2.06  0.63 3.19
 Variance  4.56  2.81 3.28 2.94 2.73 1.69  9.02 0.01
 CoefVar  1.41  0.90 0.99 1.31 0.57 0.82  14.31 0.00
GINFLRT Range  71.27  71.64 73.06 6.10 0.11 3.88  19.93 0.26
 Mean  8.23  7.52 14.32 4.32 2.50 1.57  7.26 2.18
 Variance  148.94  220.47 337.90 7.18 0.01 2.93  59.57 0.03
 CoefVar  18.09  29.31 23.59 1.66 0.00 1.87  8.21 0.02
GFDIGDP Range  11.16  21.48 9.92 1.98 0.43 4.21  1.65 2.71
 Mean  2.40  8.48 3.18 2.51 3.44 2.12  5.83 3.43
 Variance  6.91  43.11 4.04 0.88 0.09 3.26  0.40 3.67
 CoefVar  2.87  5.08 1.27 0.35 0.03 1.54  0.07 1.07
DHEAEXP Range  3.06  4.32 4.50 1.40 0.46 4.46  3.42 0.58
 Mean  1.97  3.40 3.08 5.43 1.93 5.25  5.22 6.17
 Variance  0.55  1.18 1.38 0.57 0.11 3.80  2.08 0.17
 CoefVar  0.28  0.35 0.45 0.10 0.05 0.72  0.40 0.03
DINTERG Range  23.88  24.20 11.49 2.85 1.14 1.67  2.40 0.05
 Mean  4.84  3.63 2.90 0.96 1.48 0.72  1.36 0.22
 Variance  23.37  34.13 9.10 1.90 0.65 0.53  1.00 0.00
 CoefVar  4.83  9.39 3.14 1.98 0.44 0.74  0.74 0.01
DFOOCAP Range  134.70  416.00 307.00 421.10 3.00 168.30  203.22 40.70
 Mean  106.73  151.22 177.51 762.18 193.40 198.85  280.84 524.85
 Variance  955  9533 6207 41226 4.50 6639  6136 828.24
 CoefVar  8.96  63.05 34.97 54.09 0.02 33.39  21.85 1.58
DFOOIMP Range  21.30  14.10 32.20 30.50 36.50 28.80  20.20 7.70
 Mean  6.64  8.60 15.75 29.53 46.15 31.15  16.00 34.25
 Variance  21.36  17.66 52.48 172.59 666.12 140.91  58.31 29.65
 CoefVar  3.22  2.05 3.33 5.85 14.43 4.52  3.64 0.87
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Table A10 – Summary statistics within clusters: Agriculture 
   G-90  G-20  CAIRNS  G-10  EU25  US 
Variable Statistics  Cluster  1  Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4  Cluster 5Cluster 6  Cluster 7  Cluster 8
AGVA Range  43.06 33.15 20.12 3.38 0.44 2.92 23.71  0.94
  Mean  34.47 10.73 12.56 5.94 9.76 2.32 13.63  2.08
  Variance  110.93 90.26 34.11 2.54 0.1 1.82 78.32  0.44
  CoefVar  3.22 8.41 2.72 0.43 0.01 0.79 5.75 0.21
AGEMP  Range  26.45 34.43 33.39 8.32 19.59 22.26 16.63  3.11
 Mean  -9.04  -17.1 -18.42 -15.08 -22.1 -35.04  -39.93  -27.48
 Variance  51.59  100.19 81.59 16.13 191.87 134.56  68.24  4.82
  CoefVar  -5.71 -5.86 -4.43 -1.07 -8.68 -3.84 -1.71 -0.18
AGLAND  Range  61.65 49.22 40.17 6.72 23.88 14.31 33.05 14.17
  Mean  17.33 12.51 11.53 7.97 17.42 10.66 34.16 12.05
  Variance  236.06 155.81 101.76 8.94 285.17 35.21 184.42 100.39
 CoefVar  13.62  12.46 8.82 1.12 16.37 3.3  5.4  8.33
AGVAWR  Range  5487 40821 4839 22853 4188 22298 19188  9782
  Mean  665 4921 1879 15818 2678 20524 8177  46933
  Variance  1014928 82473134 1632363 123241303 8768005 87492853 55247688 47845494
 CoefVar  1526  16759 869 7791 3274 4263  6757  1019
AGWRHA  Range  8.44 8.72 4.14 0.14 0.29 1.17 0.18 0.01
  Mean  1.98 1.48 1 0.08 1.14 0.58 0.16 0.01
 Variance  2.65  3.77 1 0 0.04 0.25  0  0
  CoefVar  1.34 2.54 1 0.05 0.04 0.43 0.03  0
AGMACH  Range  3.7 12.28 3.87 4.44 0.94 33.77 10.84  1.14
  Mean  0.46 2.11 1.01 2.28 1.94 24.94 4.71 2.17
 Variance  0.81  6.84 0.87 4.17 0.44 233.54  26.71  0.65
  CoefVar  1.76 3.25 0.87 1.83 0.23 9.36 5.68  0.3
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Table A11 – Summary statistics within clusters: Trade 
   G-90  G-20  CAIRNS  G-10  EU25  US 
Variable Statistics  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6  Cluster 7  Cluster 8
TAGIEVA  Range  1.02  10.36 3.13 1.15 0.37 2.07 2.18 1.18
  Mean  0.36 2.97 0.75 1.41 1.13 1.11 1.47 1.27
  Variance  0.06 8.59 0.34 0.29 0.07 0.96 0.67 0.69
  CoefVar  0.17 2.89 0.46 0.21 0.06 0.87 0.45 0.55
TAGIMTI  Range  0.25 0.31 0.13 0.04 0 0.05 0.07 0.01
  Mean  0.16 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.04
  Variance  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 CoefVar  0.03  0.04 0.01 0.01 0 0.01  0.01  0
TAGEXTE Range  0.87  0.41 0.42 0.17 0.04 0.02  0.41  0
  Mean  0.2  0.1 0.13 0.3 0.08 0.01 0.17 0.05
 Variance  0.05  0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0  0.03  0
 CoefVar  0.22  0.1 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.18  0
TAGSTB  Range  1.63 1.47 1.59 0.25 0.24 0.52 0.58 0.04
  Mean  0.19  0.3 0.01 -0.7 -0.33 0.65 -0.09 -0.13
 Variance  0.21  0.22 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.05  0.06  0
  CoefVar  1.08  0.74 11.59 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 -0.66 -0.01
TEXPGDP Range  42.23  66.65 43.12 19.21 55.52 33  8.79  33.17
  Mean  24.5 58.42 31.57 21.89 90.68 34.05 47.66 27.23
 Variance  144.49  275.34 124.58 65.82 1541.36 247.01  16.17  550.28
 CoefVar  5.9  4.71 3.95 3.01 17 7.25  0.34  20.21
TIMPGDP  Range  51.49 67.68 42.47 20.27 45.11 29.43 22.58 25.84
  Mean  35.14 68.86 34.34 21.5 75.31 28.26 57.92 26.71
 Variance  176.67  254.84 119.94 69.37 1017.28 171.62  84.93  333.89
  CoefVar  5.03  3.7 3.49 3.23 13.51 6.07 1.47 12.5
TMANIMP Range  62.84  30.61 22.46 13.69 7.17 26.89  26.66  5.6
  Mean  56.6 65.78 73.81 82.02 80.87 71.21 62.24 81.38
 Variance  123.58  42.06 31.45 36.28 25.7 182.83  144.48  15.66
  CoefVar  2.18 0.64 0.43 0.44 0.32 2.57 2.32 0.19
TMANEXP Range  89.79  75.99 87.23 10.5 5.29 69.96  49.2  17.77
 Mean  28.97  39.07 45.99 32.96 76.61 75.31  61.6  73.39
  Variance  799.72  599.9 794 22.44 13.97 1172.5 387.66 157.87
  CoefVar 27.61  15.35 17.27 0.68 0.18 15.57 6.29 2.15
TCOMEXP  Range  39.06  17.96 19.2 2.7 0.97 3.23 4.35 4.76
  Mean  6.47 8.05 4.59 3.54 6.04 5.94 6.18 7.78
 Variance  55.27  21.4 21.35 1.54 0.47 2.37  2.99  11.33
  CoefVar  8.54 2.66 4.66 0.43 0.08 0.4 0.48 1.46
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Table A12 – Summary statistics within clusters: Trade Policy 
   G-90 G-20  CAIRNS  G-10  EU25  US 
Variable  Statistics  Cluster 1  Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4  Cluster 5 Cluster 6  Cluster 7 Cluster 8
POAVBD Range  187.84  188.19 145.30 30.45 30.97 57.43  36.89 7.27
 Mean 62.19  77.39 55.08 19.75 27.91 36.46  12.78 8.53
 Variance  2080.21  2113.03 1305.78 244.02 479.51 798.58  228.60 26.44
 CoefVar  33.45  27.30 23.71 12.35 17.18 21.90  17.89 3.10
POVRBD Range  3298.60  1078.34 3096.18 28.70 235.10 4381.65  394.73 130.81
 Mean  234.04  279.61 449.05 23.51 197.67 2293.45  151.20 126.98
 Variance  333263  91511 490423 161 27636 4246776  37896 8556
 CoefVar  1423.94  327.28 1092.12 6.86 139.81 1851.70  250.64 67.38
POWAT Range  146.47  190.53 122.29 21.23 18.71 5.44  11.25 0.50
 Mean 47.64  62.55 40.63 12.74 19.53 1.36  2.51 0.99
 Variance  1606.17  2128.63 1029.60 107.80 175.12 7.40  24.18 0.13
 CoefVar  33.72  34.03 25.34 8.46 8.97 5.43  9.62 0.13
POAVHG Range  57.54  95.05 99.76 63.08 2.71 41.07  73.94 1.26
 Mean 37.40  40.80 57.21 76.32 84.41 64.10  57.57 98.81
 Variance  264.27  373.50 439.70 756.16 3.67 417.00  971.53 0.79
 CoefVar  7.07  9.15 7.69 9.91 0.04 6.51  16.88 0.01
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Table A13– Second nearest cluster 
 














Mozambique 7.0688  cluster  2  7.4806  0.4118 
Papua New Guinea  5.6615  cluster 2  6.2195  0.5580 
Armenia 3.5153  cluster  2  4.3728  0.8575 
Mauritania 3.6019  cluster  2  4.6952  1.0933 
Togo 3.0942  cluster  2  4.6071  1.5129 
Haiti 6.0481  cluster  2  7.9683  1.9202 
Guinea-Bissau 5.3082  cluster  2  7.3351  2.0269 
Gambia, The  3.5362  cluster 3  3.7391  0.2029 
Madagascar 3.2909  cluster  3  3.5398  0.2489 
India 6.3100  cluster  3  6.6192  0.3092 
Albania 3.7466  cluster  3  4.0779  0.3313 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  3.8904  cluster 3  4.3013  0.4109 
Nigeria 4.1211  cluster  3  4.5340  0.4129 
Malawi 5.7829  cluster  3  6.2985  0.5156 
Cote d'Ivoire  2.9052  cluster 3  3.4557  0.5505 
Kenya 2.8366  cluster  3  3.5008  0.6642 
Kyrgyz Republic  3.4831  cluster 3  4.1617  0.6786 
Cameroon 2.9691  cluster  3  3.7083  0.7392 
Uganda 3.5935  cluster  3  4.3442  0.7507 
Bangladesh 6.4484  cluster  3  7.2064  0.7580 
Georgia 3.2450  cluster  3  4.0568  0.8118 
Cambodia 4.3971  cluster  3  5.2208  0.8237 
Pakistan 3.3870  cluster  3  4.3049  0.9179 
Ghana 2.5672  cluster  3  3.5324  0.9652 
Chad 4.1136  cluster  3  5.1372  1.0236 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  7.5984  cluster 3  8.7420  1.1436 
Senegal 2.2940  cluster  3  3.4427  1.1487 
Nepal 4.2584  cluster  3  5.5631  1.3047 
Guinea 3.8245  cluster  3  5.1855  1.3610 
Tanzania 3.3411  cluster  3  4.7633  1.4222 
Central African Rep.  3.0945  cluster 3  4.5298  1.4353 
Mali 2.4191  cluster  3  3.9691  1.5500 
Niger 5.5741  cluster  3  7.3047  1.7306 
Burkina Faso  3.3487  cluster 3  5.1535  1.8048 
Burundi 4.4689  cluster  3  6.3631  1.8942 
















Rwanda 3.1379  cluster  3  5.3998  2.2619 
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Table A13– Second nearest cluster, continued 
 












Djibouti 8.1543  cluster  1  8.8107  0.6564 
Congo, Rep.  3.9929  cluster 1  5.0537  1.0608 
Lesotho 7.8143  cluster  1  9.1030  1.2887 
St. Lucia  3.0659  cluster 1  5.0960  2.0301 
Nicaragua 4.1662  cluster  3  4.2445  0.0783 
Mongolia 3.8962  cluster  3  4.0683  0.1721 
Mauritius 4.2824  cluster  3  4.4927  0.2103 
Fiji 2.8132  cluster  3  3.0629  0.2497 
Jamaica 2.3638  cluster  3  3.0508  0.6870 
Jordan 4.0978  cluster  3  4.8059  0.7081 
Kuwait 7.0233  cluster  3  7.9961  0.9728 
Belize 2.9563  cluster  3  4.0072  1.0509 
Angola 6.7702  cluster  3  7.9107  1.1405 
Trinidad and Tobago  2.7240  cluster 3  3.9002  1.1762 
Antigua and Barbuda  3.2756  cluster 3  4.6856  1.4100 
Dominica 3.2893  cluster  3  4.7749  1.4856 
Guyana 4.9917  cluster  3  6.5376  1.5459 
St. Kitts and Nevis  4.3409  cluster 3  6.2454  1.9045 
Swaziland 3.0071  cluster  3  4.9225  1.9154 
St. Vincent and Gren  2.8358  cluster 3  4.8157  1.9799 
















Barbados 3.8501  cluster  7  4.0328  0.1827 
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Table A13– Second nearest cluster, continued 
 












Paraguay  4.0754 cluster  1 4.3555  0.2801 
Guatemala  2.5964 cluster  1 2.9679  0.3715 
Sri  Lanka  3.3008 cluster  1 3.6787  0.3779 
El  Salvador  2.6476 cluster  1 3.0962  0.4486 
Zimbabwe  6.3890 cluster  1 6.8742  0.4852 
Morocco  2.5080 cluster  1 3.0748  0.5668 
Zambia  3.3160 cluster  1 3.9614  0.6454 
Indonesia  2.7732 cluster  1 3.5428  0.7696 
China  5.3990 cluster  1 6.3068  0.9078 
Bolivia  3.1157 cluster  1 4.1165  1.0008 
Dominican  Rep. 2.7651 cluster  1 3.8445  1.0794 
Peru  2.4115 cluster  1 3.5862  1.1747 
Ecuador  3.8194 cluster  1 5.2169  1.3975 
Colombia  2.8163 cluster  1 4.4188  1.6026 
Honduras  2.7331 cluster  2 3.0358  0.3027 
Botswana  4.1286 cluster  2 4.4734  0.3448 
Gabon  3.9214 cluster  2 4.4438  0.5224 
Tunisia  3.3256 cluster  2 4.0895  0.7639 
Namibia  2.3368 cluster  2 3.3368  1.0000 
Venezuela,  RB  3.4880 cluster  2 5.1091  1.6211 
Chile  2.6685 cluster  2 4.6236  1.9551 
Brazil  3.7996 cluster  4 4.8875  1.0879 
Philippines  3.4105 cluster  5 4.2726  0.8621 
Romania  6.1164 cluster  7 6.7717  0.6553 
Panama  3.5892 cluster  7 4.4587  0.8695 
Costa  Rica  2.7469 cluster  7 4.0568  1.3099 
Turkey  5.3871 cluster  7 6.7002  1.3131 
















Mexico  2.7458 cluster  7 4.6403  1.8945 
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Table A13– Second nearest cluster. continued 
 












Uruguay  2.7705 cluster  3 4.2152  1.4447 
Argentina  2.5713 cluster  3 5.2465  2.6752 


















New  Zealand  2.3478 cluster  8 5.7337  3.3859 


















Thailand  2.9264 cluster  3 5.6039  2.6775 
Korea,  Rep.  5.4599 cluster  3 7.6644  2.2045 
Switzerland  3.4682 cluster  7 6.0518  2.5836 
















Norway  3.7972 cluster  8 6.1836  2.3864 
Macedonia, FYR  2.6307  cluster 2  5.0912  2.4605 
Croatia  2.7139 cluster  3 4.8816  2.1677 
Moldova  4.2558 cluster  3 6.4238  2.1680 



















European Union 25  3.8552  cluster 8  4.7922  0.9370 
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Table B1 – Groups and coalitions within WTO 
African Group (41 countries): 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo 
(Democratic Republic), Côte d.Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
 
African Union/Group, ACP, least-developed countries (also known as .G-90., but with 64 WTO members): 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea 
(Conakry), Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, 
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
 
ASEAN (members of WTO): 
Brunei, Cambodia (from October 2004), Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
 
Cairns Group (G/AG/NG/W/11, 35, 54, 93): 
Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada (G/AG/NG/W/11, 35, 93), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay 
 
Caricom: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname 
 
Central American grouping.: Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, sponsored paper 
WT/MIN(03)/W/10 at the Cancún Ministerial Conference 
 
Developing country grouping. = joint sponsors of: 
(1) G/AG/NG/W/13 (S&D and development box): Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, El Salvador 
(2) G/AG/NG/W/14 (Green Box): Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, El Salvador 
(3) G/AG/NG/W/37 + Corr.1 (market access): Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, 
India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Zimbabwe 
 
European-East Asian grouping. = joint sponsors of: 
(1) JOB(03)/167: Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Iceland, Rep of Korea, Liechtenstein, Switzerland 
(2) WT/MIN(03)/W/12: Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
Switzerland (See G-10) 
 
G-10: 
Bulgaria, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway, Switzerland, Chinese 
Taipei (See .European-East Asian grouping.) 
 
G-20: 
(1) WT/MIN(03)/W6/Add.2: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand, Venezuela 
(2) WT/L/559 (countries participating in the 11.12 December 2003 G-20 Ministerial Meeting): Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, 
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G-33 (understood to comprise 42 countries): 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, China, Congo, Côte d.Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Mauritius, Madagascar, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, St Kitts and Nevis, 
St Lucia, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, 
Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
G-90 (see African Union/Group, ACP, least-developed countries) 
 
MERCOSUR: 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
 
MERCOSUR+. = joint sponsors of: 
(1) G/AG/NG/W/38: MERCOSUR + Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica 
(2) G/AG/NG/W/104: MERCOSUR + Bolivia, Chile, Colombia 
 
MERCOSUR, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, India and Malaysia sponsored proposal 
G/AG/NG/W/139 on export credits 
 
Non-trade concerns. = 38 countries that sponsored note G/AG/NG/W/36/Rev.1 (conference papers on nontrade 
concerns): 
Barbados, Burundi, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, EU, Fiji, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauritius, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Romania, St Lucia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Recent new members (RAMS or recently acceded members): Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova 
and Oman sponsored unofficial paper JOB(03)/170 
 
Small island developing states. (SIDS): 
Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Jamaica, Mauritius, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Transition. = joint sponsors of: 
(1) G/AG/NG/W/56 (domestic support): Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
(2) G/AG/NG/W/57 (market access): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Croatia, Lithuania 
Source: WTO, 2004 
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